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ABSTRACT

This study examines the process of Vietnam’s global integration for development in order
to conclude that Vietnam has been able to achieve economic development and human
development by joining regional and global institutions and working closely with
multilateral international development agencies.
With proper literature reviews of economic theories and empirical studies, this study
determines that Vietnam was able to graduate from dependence on the former Soviet
Union and achieved economic development and human development.
This study determines that Vietnam has become one of the best-performing developing
economies in the world. The Vietnamese people’s standard of living has improved
significantly. The World Bank estimates that within 10 years, from 1993 to 2004,
Vietnam lifted 30 million people out of poverty.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction, Objectives, and Methodology
1.1. Introduction
Today, the global integration of Vietnam has been considered a success story,
particularly with its characteristics of a communist country. The process of global
integration is seen from the country’s significant improvements to engage the world by
graduating from the status of dependence on the former Union of Socialist Soviet
Republics (U.S.S.R), shifting its ideological directions, and by making very crucial steps
into regional and global organizations. The time frame to illustrate the process of
Vietnam’s global integration is set from the country’s reunification from the Vietnam
War in April 1975 to present. Officially, the reunification of the country was set in
October 1976. After this, the Vietnamese leadership expected to develop Vietnam into
prosperity by adapting a socialism-based economy. However, it failed to achieve both
economic development as well as human development in the evidences of internal and
external factors.
Internally, the export turnover from 1976 to 1985 compensated for only a third of
the import turnover and gross foreign trade turnover was very low, averaging only US$
1.7 billion per year. The quality of life was poor and getting worse. Daily necessities such
as food, consumer goods, transport, and health and education facilities were seriously
deficient. Meanwhile, rampant inflation reduced the value of salaries and real incomes.
Overspending of the state budget increased sharply and went from 25 percent to 45
percent of revenues in the years after reunification1. Particularly, the Communist Party of

1

Bui Tat Thang, After the War: 25 Years of Economic Development in Vietnam, , available from
http://www.nira.or.jp/past//publ/review/2000spring/06thang.pdf , p. 22.
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Vietnam, as soon as it established its nation-wide control, was very much eager to
collectivize the capitalist South as part of the whole strategy for transition to socialism.
However, collectives were doing badly. The attempt to extend them to the rural South
was resisted so violently that it had to be called off. The truth was, the people were
exhausted. Most families on both sides, North and South, had lost their loved ones in the
decades of fighting. Those individuals who survived were physically impoverished by the
wars’ demands and psychologically drained by the relentless drives for national
mobilization. The entire productivity was breaking down. Absolute poverty was
widespread2.
In addition, the external factors were completely unfavorable for Vietnam to have
more export and import exchanges with countries other than the Soviet (Eastern) Bloc as
a consequence of U.S. economic sanctions against Vietnam after the fall of the U.S.backed Government of South Vietnam. This had led to the country’s economic and
diplomatic isolation from Western countries. While making every possible effort to
recover from the protracted war with huge human and material damage, roughly 2 million
people from the Vietnam side and 50,000 (fifty thousand) U.S. soldiers and US$ 3.25
billion, Vietnam was faced with tough challenges for development since the national reunification. As a result, Vietnam remained economically backward and diplomatically. In
the midst of the “East Asian Miracle,” a combination of Western sanctions and economic
mismanagement led per capita national income to fall by over 7 percent between 1978 and
1980 and to grow only slowly thereafter. Near total isolation from the West imposed major

2

James W.Morley and Masashi Nishihara, Editors, Vietnam Joins the World, M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1997, p. 4
Overview.
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obstacles to direct investment and market access that enabled other Southeast Asian countries
like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand to achieve rapid export-led growth. Also, the military
intervention of Kampuchea (Cambodia) not only precipitated Western disengagement, but
also triggered an escalation in tensions with China, which supported the ousted regime of Pol
Pot3. China’s response to the Vietnamese military intervention was to step up military
operations along Vietnam’s northern border. Military pressure from the north forced Hanoi to
rely more heavily on the Soviet Union, which provided Hanoi with economic assistance on
the order of $3 billion a year and facilitated a trading relationship with other communist
countries in the Eastern Bloc. But Soviet financial assistance and a paltry trade with other
communist states could not rectify the fundamental weaknesses in Vietnam’s economy. Parts
of the country endured severe food shortages, and imported Soviet capital failed to establish a
productive industrial base to support the economy. As Moscow’s own economic troubles
mounted in the 1980s, support from the Soviet Union began to dry up4.

Under these internal and external circumstances, Vietnam decided to make radical
reforms, a part of which was to join the world for economic development and human
development. The stages of Vietnam’s development path include the following: (1) the
status of dependence on U.S.S.R in military, economy, diplomacy, and education; (2) the
transition in foreign policy for outside engagement; (3) the settlement of Vietnam’s
military intervention of Kampuchea and the normalization of relations with People’s

3

Saloth Sar or Minh Hai, (May 19, 1928 – April 15, 1998), widely known as Pol Pot, was the leader of the

Cambodian communist movement known as the Khmer Rouge and was Prime Minister of Democratic
Kampuchea from 1976–1979. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pol_pot
4

Oliver Babson, Diplomacy of Isolation: United States Unilateral Sanctions Policy and Vietnam 1975 –
1995, available from http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/sanctions.pdf, p.6
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Republic of China as well as the normalization of relations with the United States of
America; and (4) the Vietnamese process of integrating into regional and global
organizations for economic development, i.e. trade liberalization and foreign direct
investment, and for human development, i.e. poverty reduction, education development,
and health development as identified and targeted within the framework of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) introduced by the United Nations Millennium
Declaration of September 2002.
1.2. Objectives
- To analyze how Vietnam, a communist country, has been able to achieve economic
development and human development; and
- To use Vietnam as a case study of development success emerging from dependence.
1.3. Methodology and Literature Reviews
The methodology used to prepare this thesis consisted of the four elements: (1) collection
of secondary data, tables, figures, and indicators from documents published by World
Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations Development Programme, and other
sources of references for economic development and human development; (2) description
of the developments of policies applied by Vietnam from different periods of time; (3)
presentation of some challenges faced by Vietnam during the current and future process
of global integration; and (4) conclusions and recommendations. Literature reviews,
theories of economic development and human development, will be applied along the
lines of this thesis where appropriate.

4

Chapter 2 - The Dependent Period from 1975 to 1986 (Dependence on U.S.S.R)
Soviet-Vietnamese ties were indeed closer than they had ever been at the time of
the communist victory in Indochina in April 1975. Soviet assistance had been
instrumental in enabling Hanoi (North Vietnam) to complete its victory in the south of
Vietnam after the 1973 Paris Peace Accords5 with the United States. Moreover,
Vietnam’s traditional distrust of China increased as the rapprochement between China
and the United States evolved. Hanoi’s border disputes with both the People’s Republic
of China and Cambodia and its conflict with the former over the Paracel6 and Spartly7
island groups in the South China Sea alienated Hanoi further from China. Vietnam had
essentially nowhere to turn but to the Soviet for military aid (China’s was halted with the
end of the war) and economic assistance, and as a way out of its diplomatic isolation8.
In theory, there are different mechanisms of dependence. Most theorist would
agree that a less developed country (LDC) can be considered externally dependent to the
extent that some or all of these are true: (1 )it is host to foreign direct investment; (2) its
economy is strongly oriented to external trade; (3) it receives a large amount of foreign
economic assistance; (4) it devotes considerable resources to the servicing of foreign

5

The Paris Peace Accords of 1973, intended to establish peace in Vietnam and an end to the Vietnam
Conflict, ended direct U.S. military involvement and temporarily stopped the fighting between north and
south. The governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam
(South Vietnam), and the United States, as well as the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) that
represented indigenous South Vietnamese revolutionaries signed the Agreement on Ending the War and
Restoring
Peace
in
Vietnam
on
January
27,
1973.
Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Peace_Accords.
6
The Paracel Islands consist of over 30 islets, sandbanks or reefs, occupy about 15,000 km2 of the ocean
surface, and located in the South China Sea, also known as East Vietnam Sea or East Sea, available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands.
7
The Spratly Islands are a group of more than 650 reefs, islets, atolls, cays and islands in the South China
Sea between the Philippines and Vietnam, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands.
8
Robert C. Horn, Alliance Politics Between Comrades: The Dynamics of Soviet – Vietnamese Relations,
RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, 1987, p.8
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debts; (5) it trains a large proportion of its university students in a relatively few
advanced countries; and (6) it maintains close military ties with more advanced nations
and devotes considerable resources to the purchase of arms abroad9. In practice, some of
the features were particularly true for the case of Vietnam’s dependence on the former
U.S.S.R.
2.1 Military Dependence
The U.S.S.R. had a very important role to play in providing military assistance for
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam in short, to win the Vietnam War.
By estimation, the U.S.S.R supplied about 75% of North Vietnam’s military hardware
compared to 15% from China (mainland) and East Europe about 10%. After the war,
Vietnam remained dependent on military assistance from the U.S.S.R as viewed by the
Vietnamese to defend the country from potential threats with the Kampuchea War (1977
– 1978) and the Sino-Vietnam War (1979) and to preserve the revolutionary
achievements from the Vietnam War. This was also viewed by the U.S.S.R. to use the
Vietnamese territory for Soviet forward-deployment air and naval bases from
Vladivostok (2,220 miles or 10 days by steamer – from Cam Ranh Base in the middle
part of Vietnam) to the Indian Ocean. Though the Soviet military assistance to Vietnam
was not increasing so much between 1976 and 1977, it began to soar thereafter,
especially at a time when Vietnam was fighting with Kampuchea and China for border
conflicts, as illustrated in the following table:

9

Vincent A. Mahler, “Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy – A Cross-National
Study” , Columbia University Press New York 1980.
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Table 1 Military Aid from the U.S.S.R to Vietnam
Year
Year
Amount
1976
$44.7 million
1977
1978
$700 million
1979
1980
$790 million
1981
1982
$900 million
1983
1984
$1.3 billion
1985
Source: Vietnam and The Soviet Union – Anatomy of an Alliance by
Westview Press, Boulder and London 1987

Amount
$80 million
$890 million
$450 million
$1.2 billion
$1.7 billion
Douglas Pike –

As part of the articles of the U.S.S.R – Vietnam Friendship and Cooperation
Treaty signed in 1978 by Hanoi top official delegation led by Le Duan10, then Party Chief
of Vietnam during their visit to Moscow, for example, 20 MIG-24 swept-wing fighter
planes made their ways to Hanoi. Later this year, a Soviet military mission was
established, and Soviet military advisers and military assistance started to be present in
quantity in Vietnam. The tonnage of delivered military aid doubled each year from 1977
through 1980 and then leveled off in reflection of Vietnam’s fight against the Pol Pot
regime in Kampuchea (December 1978) and with China in the border conflict (February
1979). Undoubtedly, Vietnam was heavily dependent on the U.S.S.R military assistance
in all branches with priority given to air defenses, including the stationing of MIG-23
swing-wing interceptors and augmentation of the missile defenses in major cities such as
Hai Phong, Huong Khe, Vinh, Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Bien Hoa. The U.S.S.R military
aid to Vietnam was also in quality. The People’s Army of Vietnam, PAVN, received the

10

Lê Duẩn (b. April 7, 1907 - d. July 10, 1986) was a Vietnamese communist leader. He became North
Vietnam's acting party chief in late 1956. By 1958, he was the country's top policy maker, although
nominally number two behind figurehead Hồ Chí Minh. He officially became the top leader when Hồ died
in 1969. After that, Duẩn assumed formal leadership of North Vietnam's government. After the communist
takeover of South Vietnam in 1975, Duẩn became leader of a unified Vietnamese state. He approved a
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia late in 1978 to overthrow the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge government
of that country. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Duan.
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most advanced type of missile attack patrol boats from the Soviet Navy, namely the OSA
Class II (240 tons, 40 meters in length, carrying four SSN-2 STYX surface-to-surface
missiles). The military condition of Vietnam’s dependence on the U.S.S.R could be
assessed by the Soviet Embassy Air-Naval Attache Colonel Davydov that “the Soviet
Union and its armed forces have provided and will provide SRV (Socialist Republic of
Vietnam) with all the necessary assistance for consolidating the SRV’s defense
capability”. In addition to military aid, Vietnam was also heavily dependent on the
U.S.S.R economically.
2.2. Economic Dependence
From September to December 1975, then Party Chief Le Duan headed a team of
foreign aid experts on a trip to the U.S.S.R and seven other communist countries. In
Moscow, he signed two agreements. The one signed on October 30, 1975 was for longterm loans with credit under highly favorable term (10 years). This agreement aimed at
rationalizing and modernizing the agricultural sector, developing key industrial sectors
such as primarily electric power, mining, chemistry and tool manufacture, and supplying
oil, grain, raw cotton and other commodities. The other signed on December 18, 1975
was for economic aid and technical assistance. It covered some forty major projects in
electric power, food industry, production of building materials and geological surveys.
Both of the two agreements were in support of the second Five-Year Plan (1976 – 1980)
of Vietnam. The estimated cost was $ 3-4 billion to which the U.S.S.R agreed to fund
60%, roughly at $1.2 billion in addition to $700 million in commodity aid available
during the same period. The year 1978 witnessed the beginning of the changed
8

relationship between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. Vietnam signed more than a dozen
economic aid and other agreements with the U.S.S.R. On June 29, 1978, Vietnam was
admitted as the tenth member of the Communist Common Market System at the Prime
Minister’s Meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)11 in
Bucharest. Later this year in November, Le Duan and a large delegation of top Hanoi
officials visited Moscow to sign a series of agreements related to security, economic and
military aid, trade, and science and technology. However, the continuing inability of the
Hanoi’s leadership to solve the country’s basic economic problems and its two wars as
indicated above did deepen the Vietnamese economic dependence on the U.S.S.R. Under
the mechanism of CMEA, the U.S.S.R provided Vietnam with 70% of all its imports in a
total of $12 billion worth in 1979, accounting for 94% of its raw cotton, 90% of its oil,
steel, and fertilizer, and 70% of its imported grain (3 million tons). The Vietnamese
economic dependence on the U.S.S.R was also seen from the U.S.S.R project aid. From
1975 to January 1985, the majority of about 950 projects - electric power, mining, oil and
gas, manufacturing and industrial areas, transportation and communication, and
agriculture – had been launched. Among them were 200 major projects which had been
put into operation with financial and technical assistance from the U.S.S.R. The table
below indicates how deep the Vietnamese economic dependence was on the U.S.S.R.

11

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Russian: Совет экономической взаимопомощи, Sovet
ekonomicheskoy vsaymopomoshchi, СЭВ, SEV, English abbreviation COMECON, CMEA, or CAME),
1949–1991, was an economic organization of communist states and a kind of Eastern Bloc equivalent to—
but more geographically inclusive than—the European Economic Community. The military equivalent to
the Comecon was the Warsaw Pact, though Comecon's membership was significantly wider. The Comecon
was the Eastern Bloc's reply to the formation of the OEEC (Organization of European Economic Cooperation). Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COMECON
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Table 2 Economic Aid from the U.S.S.R. to Vietnam
Year
1976

Amount
$ 560 -750 million

Year
1977

1978

$700 million - $1 billion

1979

1980
$2.9 – 3.2 billion
1982
$1.18 billion
1984
$1.4 billion
Source : Vietnam and The Soviet Union – Anatomy
Westview Press, Boulder and London 1987

1981
1983
1985
of an

Amount
$570 million – $1
billion
$800 million - $1.1
billion
$0.9 billion
$1.3 billion
$1.6 billion
Alliance by Douglas Pike –

2.3. Diplomatic Dependence
The Soviet diplomats supported and defended Vietnam’s military intervention in
Kampuchea at the United Nations and other international gatherings. The U.S.S.R vetoed
a UN Security Council resolution, sponsored by the members of the Association of South
East Nations (ASEAN), requesting withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochinese
countries. In addition, Moscow supported Ha Noi for the issue of refugees (boat people),
which emerged after the Vietnam War. The Indochinese exodus was one of the great
migrations in modern history involving more than 1 million people. However, Moscow
treated it as a non-problem as illustrated by the Soviet attitude towards an incident with
fleeing refugees and a Norwegian aid project in 1980. The incident had it that Norway
donated a sophisticated fishing trawler to Vietnam and sent along a Norwegian crew to
demonstrate its use. At sea, the trawler encountered some refugees in a small open boat.
A Vietnamese security squad aboard the trawler opened fire with machine guns, killing
all the refugees. Horrified by this scene, the Norwegian fishermen immediately returned
the trawler to port and embarked on the first available plane for Oslo, refusing official
gifts offered to them at Hanoi airport. The Norwegian government backed their action by
10

rejecting a “complaint” from Hanoi, whereupon the U.S.S.R volunteered to send a crew
to replace the Norwegian. The Vietnamese military intervention in Kampuchea, although
considered as legitimate in view of national defense, and the issue of boat people put the
country into a political isolation that inevitably deepened its diplomatic (or political)
dependence on the U.S.S.R. The Vietnamese also received a significant support of
education from the U.S.S.R.
2.4. Education Dependence
The U.S.S.R undertook the training of 2,000 technicians and 400 vocational
education teachers per year in support of the Vietnam’s 1976 – 1980 Five – Year Plan.
There had been an intensive effort by Moscow to insinuate itself into the Vietnamese
educational system. Accordingly, educational institutions in Vietnam relied increasingly
on Soviet sources for everything from textbooks to school buildings since 1978. By 1985,
more than one hundred Vietnamese educational institutions and state research institutes
were involved in systematic educational programs with the U.S.S.R. Particularly, during
the 1980 – 1985 Five-Year Plan, the number of Vietnamese full-time students in the
U.S.S.R at any one time was about 30,000. Apart from the number of Vietnamese
students attending educational institutions in the U.S.S.R, Vietnam also hosted Soviet
educators and educational advisers. As estimated, there were about 2,000 Soviet
educators and educational advisers working in the country in 1982. Additionally,
Vietnamese educational dependence on the U.S.S.R included school constructions. From
the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 to 1985, Soviet constructed eight vocational training
schools and three industrial teachers colleges, and equipped three more.
11

Chapter 3 - The Transitional Period from 1986 to 1995
As seen from the political, security, and economic points of view, the deep
dependence on the U.S.S.R was crucial to Vietnam during its process of immersing the
two economies of the North and the South and the wars fought with Kampuchea and
China. Yet, the dependence cost Vietnam dearly in economic backwardness that put the
country into hunger and poverty in addition to international isolation.
3.1 Economic development and human development under dependence on U.S.S.R
Under the full dependence on the U.S.S.R, Vietnam remained an impoverished
country, barely able to feed its increasing population, with little heavy and only limited
light industry to produce trade goods. With the dependent elements as presented above,
the centrally planned Vietnamese economy was quite similar to the Soviet Bloc’s model
on the grounds of internal mechanism and poor levels of development. While it was not a
total closed economy, Vietnam gained a little economic development particularly when
the Vietnam War came to an end in 1975. Instead of concentrating on recovering
economy, improving labor skills, and producing more agricultural products and consumer
goods as results of heavy damage from the war, Vietnam adopted an economic policy by
prioritizing heavy industry and “revolution of the relations of production” with the
extension of the centrally-planned mechanism in the North to the South where it used to
drive its economic development in the capitalism model. Though some industrial projects
were built, such as electricity power, cement production, and other sectors supported by

12

the U.S.S.R, the economy remained stagnant12. The principal causes13 for the failure of
economic development could be summarized as follows:
- The enforcement of the socialist reform of the economy in the South by
collectivization of agricultural farms and nationalism of trade and industry completely
damaged the people’s incentives for production in the South.
- Excessive bureaucracy, distorted prices, and the incentive system, and the wrong
industrialization strategy – all the products of a central command economy – greatly
hindered its economic efficiency.
- Vietnamese military intervention in Kampuchea since the end of 1978 had not
only caused the China-Vietnam War, but also resulted in a diplomatic isolation of the
country, which further strained its resources.
Under these circumstances, the Vietnam leaders thought of how to move away
from outward dependence on the U.S.S.R to engagement in the world. The year 1986,
unlike 1978 that marked the deeper dependence, was a significant time for Vietnam to
start the process of engagement by ideological modification, institutional and structural
reforms.
Ideologically, as indicated by Vo Van Kiet14, then Chairman of the Vietnamese
State Planning Commission and a key economic reformer, the economic goals had not
been met mainly because too much money had been spent on large-scale industrial
12

Bui Tat Thang, After the War: 25 Years of Economic Development in Vietnam, , available from
http://www.nira.or.jp/past//publ/review/2000spring/06thang.pdf
13
James W.Morley and Masashi Nishihara, Editors, Vietnam Joins the World, An East Gate Book,
Copyright @1997 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc., p.38.
14
Võ Văn Kiệt (23 November 1922 - 11 June 2008[1]) was a Vietnamese politician and statesman. He was
Prime Minister of Vietnam from 8 August 1991 to 25 September 1997. He was one of the Vietnamese
political leaders that led the innovation (ðổi mới) policy in Vietnam. Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vo_Van_Kiet
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projects also left unfinished. He also said that China was making tremendous efforts in its
economic recovery by adopting some capitalist measures, and urged Vietnam to consider.
As communist country, however, Vietnam had to rely on the ideology of MarxismLeninism as an economically and politically driving force. Against this ideological
background, then General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh15, a reform-minded leader, stated
that
Bold use must be made of the potential of all economic structures in the country,
including private and individual structures. But this does not mean that elements
of capitalist exploitation will be restored. The leading role will always belong to
the socialist sector.

This was backed up by the Party’s media organ, Nhan Dan Daily News, that we
are using capitalists to improve our economy. Marxism is against exploitation – not
against being rich. Sometimes we misunderstand Marxism… that there will be no rich
people and everyone will be equal can only happen in the advanced phase of capitalism.
In the meantime, we have to put up with people being rich because they are talented and
have a good mind.
3.2. The Communist Party’s Sixth Congress in December 1986
With the above ideology in mind, the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese
Communist Party (December 1986) marked a turning point of great significance to
transform the Vietnamese economy to an open, market-oriented, and globally integrated
model. This model was to (1) enact policies for the integration of Vietnam into the world

15

Nguyễn Văn Linh (July 1, 1915–April 27, 1998) was a political leader of the Vietcong during the
Vietnam War. He was the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam from 1986 to 1991. During
his time in office, Linh was a strong advocate of "doi moi" (renovation), an economic plan whose aim is to
turn Vietnam economy to a market economy. As such, Linh was often touted the Vietnamese Gorbachev
after
the
Soviet
leader,
who
introduced
Perestroika.
Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguyen_Van_Linh
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and regional economies; (2) speed up foreign trade activities, encouraging foreign direct
investments; and (3) stimulate the development of private organizations, individuals, and
economic sectors. This model, known worldwide as “Doi Moi” in Vietnamese and
“Renovation” or “Open-door Policy” in English, was made under the influence of the
twenty-seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
February 1986 with the slogans of “glasnost” and “perestroika” by then Soviet Party
Leader Gorbachev. Frustrated with the Vietnamese lack of reform and management, he
should be pleased with the degree to which his influence has been felt in the realm of
“glasnost” or “open door”. Based on this model, Vietnam has been adopting the measures
that are closely related to the Neoclassical Model of Economic Development proposed by
Robert Solow that “Economic growth can be exogenous. It depends upon freer
international trade, reduction in administration, more open markets, privatization, and
reduction in government interference”. In carrying out this model, Vietnam did make a
crucial move in modifying the Marxism – Leninism ideology with certain elements of
capitalism for development and engagement in the world from being dependent on the
U.S.S.R. To prepare for this process, Vietnam made major changes in institutions and
economic structure.
Institutionally, in order to put this ideology as shown in the above policy making
into practice, Vietnam implemented some key institutional readjustments as demanded by
the open-door policy. To this end, Vietnam enhanced the functions performed by the
relevant governmental agencies, especially the establishment of Ministry of Planning and
Investment (MPI) from the State Planning Commission and the State Committee for
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Cooperation and Investment. The MPI proposed strategies for domestic economic
development and foreign direct investment incentives to the government. Ministry of
Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also given more functions to perform in more
foreign trade relations and diplomatic relations with countries all over the world. Back to
the period of Vietnamese dependence on the U.S.S.R., the Ministry of Trade used to
handle imports and exports mainly with the Soviet under the framework of Commodity
Exchange and Payment Agreement (1981 – 1985). The role played by Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was also meaningful during the process of Vietnam’s engagement in the
world. What Vietnam has achieved as of today largely depends on the smooth
coordination of the three indicated ministries, especially the efforts made by the Ministry
of Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the process of joining regional and global
organizations for economic development and human development.
Structurally, Vietnam has been making structural adjustments in privately owned
and state-owned as well as agriculture sectors. In realization of the importance on
privatization attached to economic development, Vietnam had shown its positive manner
in the process of facilitating the development of privately owned enterprises (POE) and
reforming state-owned enterprises (SOE).

In his opening remarks to the National

Assembly in November 1999, then Prime Minister stressed the importance of creating a
favorable climate for private sector development, and in the same year, the Enterprise
Law was enacted to provide a strong basis for private sector development. Also,
privatization is defined economically as a method of reallocating assets and resources
from the public sector to the private sector. In Vietnam, it is the process of reducing
16

importance of stated-owned enterprises as shown decline hereunder in the major shares in
manufacturing, bank credit, and non-oil exports.
Figure 1 SOE Reduction in Vietnam from 1998 to 2004

- SOE share in manufacturing was down to roughly 43% from 48%; SOE share in bank
credit from 53% to 38%; and SOE share in non-oil exports from 63% to 33% for the
1998 – 2004 period. The process of privatization will be illustrated in more details in the
part of Achievements in economic development.
According to the economist W. Arthur Lewis,

Structural Transformation is the

general theory of the development process in surplus-labor the Third World nations
during most of the 1960s and early 1970s. It still has many adherents today. In the Lewis
model, the underdeveloped economy consists of two sectors: a traditional, overpopulated
rural subsistence sector characterized by zero marginal labor productivity classified as
surplus labor possibly withdrawn from, and a high-productivity modern urban industrial
sector into which labor from the subsistence sector is gradually transferred. Both labor
transfer and modern-sector employment growth are brought about by output expansion in
that sector 16. This model is suited to Vietnam as a primarily agricultural economy for its
16
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structural reform. With the table below17 of GDP share by sectors in Vietnam from 1990
to 2005, agriculture’s share of total output decreased noticeably while output in the
industrial and services sectors increased.
Table 3 Structural Transformation in Vietnam
SECTOR
% GDP (1990)
% GDP (1994)
% GDP (1995)
% GDP (1997)
% GDP (1999)
% GDP (2000)
% GDP (2005)

AGRICULTURE
41
29
27.2
26
25.8
24.5
20.89

INDUSTRY
23
30
Unknown
31
33.5
Unknown
41.04

SERVICES
36
42
44
43
40.7
38.8
38.7

One of the significant domestic changes in Vietnam to be prepared for the opendoor policy is the legal framework for trade policy as illustrated in the below table:
Table 4 Major changes in trade policy in the first few years of Doi Moi
Year Changes in trade and exchange system
1986
1987 - Law on Foreign Investment —
introduction of ‘open door’ policy
1988 - Foreign exchange control decree
liberalises
retention of foreign exchange, opening
of foreign currency accounts, use of
transfers to pay for imports and repay
foreign loans
- Devaluation of trade and invisible
payments
exchange rates
17

Other reforms
- VI Party Congress declares beginning of
Doi Moi
- Land law established private use of
allocated land in agriculture
- Creation of a central treasury to execute
the budget
- Creation of two tier banking system
- Cooperative method of agriculture
production
abandoned in favor of households
- Farming households given long term
rights to use land for agricultural

Sources: 1. Vietnam – An Asian Developing Country in Transition – Case Study Australia –
Government Education Resource Achievements in Social Economic Developments 2. Achievements in
Socio-Economic Development 1986 – 2005 The Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam.
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- Restrictions on establishment of
foreign trading
organisations relaxed and central
1989 government
monopoly of foreign trade terminated
- Law on Import and Export Duties
introduces the customs tariff

production
- Encouragement of private enterprises
becomes
official policy
- Land Law creates nontransferable.
exclusive land
use rights for agriculture

- Quotas removed on all but ten export
and 14 import commodities
(subsequently reduced to seven export
and 12 import commodities)
- Requirement that SOEs fulfill CMEA
export targets before exporting to
convertible currency area removed
- Number of export commodities
subject to export duties reduced from
30 to 12 and most rates reduced
- Producers of exportables allowed to
sell to any appropriately licensed
foreign trade company
- Number of import commodities
1990 subject to duties reduced from 124 to
80, range of rates expanded from 5–50
per cent to 5–120 per cent
- Foreign exchange rate system unified
- Special sales tax introduced
- Turnover tax and profit tax introduced
- Law on Foreign Investment revised

1991

- Foreign exchange trading floors
opened at SBV
- Regulation on setting up export
processing zones (EPZs) promulgated
- Export duty on rice reduced from 10
per cent to 1 per cent
- Imported inputs used to produce
exports exempted from duty
19

- Nearly all forms of direct subsidisation
of production and price control removed
— end of ‘two price’ system
- Domestic trading in gold legalised
- Ordinance on Economic Contracts
establishes rights
for legal entities to enter into contracts
- Bank interest rates made positive in real
terms

- Law for State Bank of Vietnam and
National Law on
Banks, Cooperative Credit Institutions
and Financial
Institutions enacted, prohibiting SBV
from commercial banking and
empowering it as central bank
- Law on Private Enterprises establishes
legal basis for
establishment of sole proprietorships
- Law on Companies establishes legal
basis for, limited
liability and shareholder business entities
- Agriculture Bank of Vietnam allowed to
lend to households

- Private companies allowed to directly
engage in international trade
1992
- Harmonised system of tariff
nomenclature
introduction
- Foreign investment law amended to
reduce
discrimination in favour of joint
ventures against
100 per cent foreign owned enterprises,
and to
introduce build operate transfer (BOT)
concept for infrastructure projects
- Trade agreement signed with
European Union (EU) establishes quota
on exports of textiles and clothing to
EU and grants tariff preference on
selected imports from EU

- New constitution allows individuals to
exercise
property rights over income producing
assets and
personal property
- Pilot equitisation program for SOEs
introduced

Source: Trade, Development, and Poverty Reduction – The Case of Vietnam, available
at: http://www.cuts-citee.org/PDF/BACKGROUNDER-Final_Vietnam.pdf

In order to escape international isolation and take advantage of structural changes
in external conditions, Hanoi launched a new diplomatic offensive consisting of four
parts: (1) to get out of the Cambodian quagmire; (2) to improve relations with ASEAN
countries; (3) to normalize relations with the United States; and (4) to normalize relations
with the People’s Republic of China18.
3.3. Detaching from Kampuchea
In addition to the above radical reform in foreign policy, Vietnam was in need of
settling the issue of its military intervention in Kampuchea as a pre-requisite for
engagement as demanded by those countries and regional organizations Vietnam wished
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to re-establish or establish relations with, such as the United States of America, People’s
Republic of China, and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Vietnamese military intervention in Kampuchea, begun at midnight,
December 24, 1978, was the decisive turning point both for bilateral relations between
Vietnam and Kampuchea and for the triangular relations among the People’s Republic of
China, the U.S.S.R and Vietnam. A new structure of regional confrontation became
evident. On the one hand, a dual rivalry divided Cambodia: the antagonism between
China and the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the “brother enemy” confrontation between
pro-Soviet communists and pro-Chinese ones, with the Beijing-Khmer Rouge alliance
politically backed by ASEAN as well as the Western capitals19.
Vietnam’s policy towards the issue of military intervention in Kampuchea and the
normalization of relations with China was made clear at the Eleventh Conference of the
Foreign Ministers of Indochina held in Phnom Penh, the capital of Kampuchea, in August
1985. In a Joint Statement at this Conference, Vietnam expressed a desire for
normalization of relations with China and the intention, publicly mentioned for the first
time, to complete the withdrawal of the Vietnamese voluntary troops from Kampuchea
before 1990.

The nature of the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from

Kampuchea was closely related to, by Vietnam’s expectation, progress on such other
issues as the lifting of U.S. embargo against Vietnam, the start of talks on U.S. – Vietnam
normalization of relations, as well as China – Vietnam normalization of relations. This
was really a significant concession of Vietnam to escape from international isolation, or
19
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in other words, had doors opened for Vietnam to engage the world. Consequently, the
Vietnamese troop withdrawal brought the international community closer together at the
Paris Accord on Kampuchea. This Accord was concluded in October 1991. Accordingly,
China declared an end to its aid to the Khmer Rouge, making it clear that China had split
with Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge. The withdraw of the last group of
Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea in September 1989 constituted confirmation of the
definite change in Vietnam’s Kampuchea policy that had evolved since 1985. It was
Heng Samrin20 of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), who first announced in
January 1989, on the occasion of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers’ Conference, that
Vietnam would complete its withdrawal before September 1989 on the condition that a
political solution would be reached in advance. However, three months later, in April,
Hanoi announced the withdrawal within the same time limit without any condition
attached at this time. The biggest reason behind this unconditional withdrawal was to
prove to the international community Vietnam’s desire for peace in Kampuchea21.
3.4. Normalizing Relations with People’s Republic of China
The hostility between the former “comrades” occurred in the years 1979 – 1990.
China was outraged that Vietnam successfully expelled the China-backed Pol Pot regime
in a very short time22, established the pro-Vietnam Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh,
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and called for a “battle alliance” of the three Indochinese countries23, and had already
concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Laos. China then denounced
Vietnam as the “Cuba of the East,” charging it with carrying out proxy activities for the
Soviet Union. China also accused Vietnam of being a “small hegemonist” with an
ambition to form a “ Federation of Indochina” and thereby gain hegemony in South East
Asia. The charge, of course, was denounced by Vietnam. In early 1979, Deng Xiaoping24
visited the United States. On January 30, he revealed his plan to punish Vietnam to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the former President Jimmy Carter and
appeared to receive de facto approval. On February 17, Chinese forces initiated a “selfdefensive counterattack” across the Vietnam border, and after occupying Lang Son
province on March 5, withdrew behind the border. Although the war was called
defensive, it was clear that Chinese intentions were, first, to constrain Vietnamese action
in Kampuchea by threatening the northern part of the country and, second, to “punish”
Vietnam” for not only violating the international code of nonaggression, but also for
expelling the pro-China Khmer Rouge regime from Phnom Penh. Apart from attacking
Vietnam from the northern part of the country, China was an active player in the
prolonged war in Kampuchea by providing most of the military assistance that kept the
Khmer Rouge in the field and encouraged them to join the popular Prince Norodom
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The three Indochinese countries include: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
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facto leader of the People's Republic of China from 1978 to the early 1990s. Source:
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Sihanouk25, whom China also supported, and Son Sann26, the former premier, to form a
united anti-Vietnam front27.
The situation in Kampuchea was stalemated until the late 1980’s, when the
ravages of the war, the failures of the socialist system, and the loss of financial support
from its Soviet and the East European allies forced Vietnam to make a fundamental
change of direction. The war in Kampuchea was terminated, the economic reform was
undertaken from the Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986, and the doors
were opened to peaceful engagement in the world community. It was in this context that
the decision was taken to try to put relations with China on a new footing. For its part,
China, suffering from the international isolation imposed after the Tiananmen Incident28
in June 1989, also saw the desirability of détente. Unofficial contacts picked up. Crossborder trade was resumed. In September 1990, in the context of the Kampuchea peace
negotiations, a secret meeting between leaders of the two countries was held in Chengdu,
China. Jiang Zemin29, Li Peng30 from China and Nguyen Van Linh, Pham Van Dong31
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from Vietnam attended the meeting. After the meeting, exchanges between the two
countries became frequent.
Finally in November 1991, two weeks after the conclusion of the Paris Accord on
Cambodia, official relations between Vietnam and China were restored. By
normalization, however, the Vietnamese did not mean to signal a return to the heady days
when they saw the Chinese as comrades in a struggle of global proportions. The two
countries are, of course, intensely interested in each other’s reform policies. As Nguyen
Van Linh and Vo Van Kiet remarked on the occasion of Jiang Zemin’s visit in November
1994, one of the things that drew the countries together was the similarity of their
situations and the possibility therefore of “learning” from each other. Each was trying to
transform a planned economy into a market economy. Each wanted to integrate into the
world market. Each was trying to preserve its political system by a single party. Each
shared the view that for reform and economic development, a peaceful international
environment was indispensable32.
The diplomatic resolutions with Cambodia and China have brought about security
to Vietnam for economic development as these countries have become trading partners

China leaders, serving as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 1989 to 2002, as
President of the People's Republic of China from 1993 to 2003, and as Chairman of the Central Military
Commission from 1989 to 2004. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiang_Zemin.
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Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1998 to
2003 and was second-ranking in the Communist Party of China (CPC) behind Jiang Zemin on the Politburo
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with Vietnam. This has led to increasing trading activities at the bilateral levels between
Vietnam and Cambodia and Vietnam and China respectively within the frameworks of
ASEAN and World Trade Organization (WTO).

Given below are the illustrating

statistics of the Vietnamese trading and foreign direct investment activities with these two
countries.
In 2006 alone, exports between Cambodia and Vietnam increased up to 30%; the
export turnover from Vietnam to Cambodia reached 780 million U.S. dollars, and that
from Cambodia to Vietnam reached 170 million U.S. dollars. The two-way exports
would be expected at 2 billion U.S. dollars by 2010 as replied by Ambassador of the
Kingdom of Royal Cambodia to Vietnam to press interviews on the occasion of the 40th
Anniversary of the Diplomatic Relationship between the two countries in the capital of
Hanoi, Vietnam.
According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam, Chinese
investors have 437 projects worth of 1,182 billion U.S. dollars operative in Vietnam as of
April 2007. China ranks 14/77 on the list of countries and territories with foreign direct
investments in Vietnam.
Therefore, the successful relationships with Cambodia and China have brought
about not only border security but also trading prosperity to Vietnam, thus making the
country a safe and favorable climate for foreign direct investment.
3.5. Normalizing relations with the United States of America
Dealing with the United States became a hard part since both sides had quite a
number of outstanding issues, such as: a peaceful political settlement in Cambodia after
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the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, the Prisoners of War (POW) and Missing in Action
(MIA), the key issues as indicated in the so-called roadmap for a normalization process
presented by the George H.W. Bush Administration in April 1991. Earlier in the 1980’s,
both countries showed their willingness to work with each other on a humanitarian
operation. Late U.S. President Ronald Reagan dispatched his special envoy, late General
John W. Vessey to Vietnam for talks with Tran Quang Co, Vice Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Vietnam about the resettlement in the U.S. for former South Vietnamese
Government officials, military and civil, as well as those working closely with the U.S.
government and U.S. military forces. They were released from the re-education camps.
Regardless of how hard it is, Vietnam has been making thus far outstanding efforts in
successfully dealing with the U.S. on two key humanitarian and economic issues.
In respect to the POW/MIA issue, Vietnam delivered significant documents to the
U.S. This led to the declaration by former President Bill Clinton in July 1993 that the
United States would not oppose Vietnam-bound aid from international financial
institutions. Then, all economic sanctions against Vietnam were lifted by the Clinton
Administration on February 3, 1994. On July 11, 1995, former President Clinton made an
official statement to normalize diplomatic relations with Vietnam.
Economically, Vietnam officially entered into trading with the U.S by the
Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) on December 10th, 2001. BTA aimed at lowering tariff
for Vietnam from 40% down to 4% to widen the U.S market for Vietnamese exports on
an equal footing with other trading competitors, thus increasing exports from Vietnam to
the U.S between US$1 billion in 2001 and US$ 5 billion in 2004 while U.S exports to
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Vietnam doubled. While it is still early to make any concrete assessment because the
implementation of BTA relies on how the two countries conduct in the decades to come “It takes two to tango” as commented by the former Deputy Secretary of State, Robert B.
Zoellick during his visit in May 2005 to Vietnam. It is obviously that the BTA has
positive impacts on the economic development of Vietnam, particularly in the areas of
trade and investment.
The BTA significantly improved Vietnam’s business environment, encouraging
more US-related FDI, and also encouraged non-U.S. FDI, especially in factories
to produce apparel, footwear, furniture, seafood, and other products to be
exported to the huge U.S. market. In 2004, U.S.-related FDI accounted for 20%
of FDI into Vietnam.33.

The trading relations between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the United
States were also indicated in Remarks by U.S Secretary of Commerce Carlos M.
Gutierrez at the seminar jointly organized by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam
Chamber of Commerce & Industry (VCCI), and US-Vietnam Friendship Society on
November 6, 2007, illustrated as below:

The United States is Vietnam’s top export market, and an important source of
investment. And Vietnam is one of America’s fastest growing markets in Asia.
During the first eight months of this year, U.S. exports to Vietnam grew 67
percent. It is estimated that our two-way trade will surpass $12 billion this year.
Additionally, the BTA gave impetus to domestic reforms such as the Enterprise
Law, which liberalized the domestic private sector. It unleashed hundreds of
thousands of private businesses. And it created millions of jobs, effectively
helping the domestic non-state sector eclipse the state sector.

With these developments, the U.S. has proved a key counterpart of Vietnam into
the process of integrating into the world. In this sense, the political leaders of Vietnam
33
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have been patient and concessionary enough to deal with the U.S. For example, the main
obstacle to full WTO membership of Vietnam was a U.S. Congressional delay in granting
Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) also known as “Most-Favored
Nation” (MFN)34 status. In May 2006, the two countries signed a bilateral market access
agreement, the last of twenty-eight trade agreements Vietnam had to negotiate with the
other WTO members to gain membership. Although these types of trade agreements do
not normally necessitate approval from Congress, then U.S President was barred from
granting Vietnam PNTR status for Vietnam is a communist state prohibited from such
status under a 1974 trade act.
With a new direction in foreign policy, Vietnam had made significant achievements in
clearing all obstacles, as shown in the issue of Cambodia and the normalizations of
relations with China and the United States, and other Western countries for economic
development and human development.

Since the major obstacles were removed,

Vietnam had started the process of integrating in the world.

34

Most favoured nation (MFN), also called Normal Trade Relations in the United States, is a status
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Chapter 4 - The Global Integration Period from 1995 to 2005 and
Achievements in Economic Development and Human Development
As set in the resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party
(December 1986), Vietnam is keen to open markets to the regional and global economies.
The country has made very important steps in engaging the world from economic
perspectives as seen from its economic relations with ASEAN, Asia-Pacific Forum for
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and WTO for economic development. High levels of
economic interdependence, most notably trade flows, the complementarities of
economics and policies, the availability of compensatory mechanisms for integration in
developing countries, and the desire to attract foreign investment through creation of a
larger market are commonly linked to regional economic initiatives35.
4.1. Achievements in economic development
From the economic point of view, Vietnam is on the right path for economic
development as illustrated in trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, privatization,
structural transformation (structural transformation has been mentioned earlier as a
preparation for Vietnam to join the global economy) , and official development
assistance.
4.1.1. Trade Liberalization
Free trade can be an engine of economic growth. For an overview of how free
trade brings about benefits to economic development, let us see the traditional arguments
as outlined: (1) The theory of absolute advantage by Adams Smith suggests that countries
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differ in their ability to produce goods efficiently. The theory suggests that a country
should specialize in producing goods in areas where it has an absolute advantage and
import goods in areas where other countries have absolute advantages; (2) The theory of
comparative advantage by David Ricardo suggests that it makes sense for a country to
specialize in producing those goods that it can produce most efficiently, while buying
goods that it can produce relatively less efficiently from other countries even if that
means buying goods from other countries that it could produce more efficiently itself.
The theory of comparative advantage also suggests that unrestricted free trade brings
about increased world production; that is, that trade is a positive-sum game. The theory of
comparative advantage also suggests that opening a country to free trade stimulates
economic growth, which creates dynamic gains from trade. The empirical evidence
seems to be consistent with this claim; and (3) The Heckscher-Ohlin theory argues that
the pattern of international trade is determined by differences in factor endowments. It
predicts that countries will export those goods that make intensive use of locally
abundant factors and will import goods that make intensive use of factors that are locally
scarce36.
Paul Samuelson extended H-O Theorem also argues that after trade, country’s
abundant factor of production will benefit, and scare factor production will lose. Trade
gives a higher benefit to country’s abundant factor of production. Since developing
countries have abundant labor, a mutually beneficial trade can occur if they specialize in
labor intensive goods and export them to the rest of the world. By doing this, they would
experience higher rate and/or higher labor employment.
36
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As a member of the Soviet Bloc before 1986, Vietnam’s international trade was
limited to Commodity Exchange Program with Socialist member countries with high
tariffs and numerous non-tariff barriers to govern these trade activities. In order to have
more trade activities, as an important part of the Vietnamese economy, Vietnam has
implemented trade liberalization, including tariff reductions and other measures designed
to relax import and export restrictions, particularly Decision 46 by the then Prime
Minister, coming into effect in May 2001, has led to a reduction in non-tariff barriers and
more transparent and predictable import and export regulations.
Furthermore, trade liberalization has been seen from bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements with regional and international countries Vietnam has been engaging
for principal exports as agricultural products, marine products, crude oil, rubbers, coffee,
shoes, and garments and for main imports as machinery and equipment, petroleum
products, fertilizers, steel products. As a result of trade liberalization, Vietnam’s foreign
trading activities have been expanding rapidly since 1990. Exports grew at an average
annual rate of 24.7% for the period from 1990 to 2001. Total exports reached US$ 15,027
million in 2001 and total imports reached US$ 16,200 million in the same year. Within
the last few years, for example, as in 2004, crude oil was the leading export – increasing
by 33.5% in spite of a decrease in volume of 7.2%. In the first ten months of 2005,
exports grew by 22% compared to imports growing at 18.3%. In addition to the
percentage growth of Vietnam’s exporting and importing activities, the structure of
Vietnamese exports has changed remarkably in recent years. The U.S, EU and China
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increased their share of Vietnamese exports by about 50% since 2001 with smaller shares
of intra-ASEAN trade and exports to East Asia.
At the bilateral level, Vietnam signed a number of trade agreements with more
than 60 countries; including the significant bilateral agreement with the United States of
America taking effect in December 2001. At the regional and international levels,
Vietnam agreed to participate in ASEAN, APEC, and WTO as the three major regional
and global economic institutions for further economic development.

Vietnam’s

participation in these organizations will be mentioned in a separate chapter.
Figure 2 Exports to China

Figure 3 Exports to U.S. and EU

Source: Regional Outlook Forum 2006 – Singapore. Paper on Vietnam Economic Update
from 2006 and Prospects to 2010 prepared by Dr.Adam McCArty.
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As argued by the Neoclassical model that economic growth can be exogenous,
dependent on international trade, Vietnam has been successful in expanding more trading
activities to the rest of the world thanks to the “Doi Moi” Process, and economic
development is traditionally measured by Gross Domestic Product. This is further
confirmed that Vietnam has achieved economic growth as shown in the below figure:

Figure 4 Annual Real GDP Growth (%) from 1995 to 2005

Source: Investment Climate Assessment Vietnam 2006 as a part of the Presentation by Mme Pham Chi
Lan, Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister of Vietnam for the Prime Minister’s Research Commission, at
Workshop on Investment Climate and Foreign Direct Investment in CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
and Vietnam) Countries, hosted by Private Sector Development – the World Bank.

According to the figure, there was a decline in Real GDP Growth Rate from 1997
to 1999 due partly to the Asian Economic Crisis. Vietnam, however, thereafter did regain
its Real GDP Growth Rate from 7.0 to 7.5 from 2001 to 2005. In parallel with more
trading activities with the rest of the world, Vietnam has adopted foreign direct
investment

policy

for

economic
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development.

4.1.2. Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam
According to the Neoclassical Model, Robert Solow argues that output growth
results from one or more of the three factors: increase in labor quantity and quality
(through population growth and education), increase in capital (through saving and
investment), and improvements in technology. To apply this growth argument to
Vietnam’s economic development, it is in line with the roles played by Vietnam’s policy
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to: (1) Constitute important added resources for
national economic development; (2) Help improve the technological level of domestic
enterprises; and (3) Help create jobs and develop the human resources.
The first Law on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Vietnam was passed by the
National Assembly (NA) on December 29th, 1987 and went through amendments in
1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, with the forms of business-cooperation contract, joint-venture,
100%-foreign ownership in addition to Export Processing Zone (EPZs), Industrial Parks
(IPs), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), and Build-Transfer
(BT). Particularly, the new Investment Law which was passed and came into effect on
July 1st 2006 has created more favorable conditions as a means of adaptability to the
investment climate of the country with more incentives and relax in licensing procedures
to attract foreign investors, such as reducing land rental fee at 0.18 – 1.08 US$/m2/year in
suburban areas in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City; keeping utilities supply cost down at
US$ 0.086 to US$ 0.105 for office use; especially offering freedom to repatriate profit
after completing all stipulated obligation with the government (tax rate at 0%); and fixing
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licensing procedures at not more than 60 working days, including registration and
evaluation of investment.
Since 1998, as a consequence, FDI inflows into Vietnam have been very
encouraging and regarded as a momentum for the country to make a smooth transition
from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy with an annually
significant increase from US$0.32billion in 1988 to nearly US$ 6.3 billion as committed
in 2005 , thus creating about 1 million jobs, contributing US$ 1 billion to the State
Budget while at the same time enhancing management skills and modern technology in
use and restructuring economy towards industrialization and modernization regardless
of “ups-and-downs” with “downs” partly due to the regional financial crisis 1990s, in
attracting FDI and of “the gap” between FDI commitments (registered capital) and
disbursements (realized capital) - the investment inflows are usually higher than the
investment disbursements.

Figure 5 Investment Inflows from 1988 to 2005
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The figure above shows the overall trend of FDI inflows in Vietnam for the period
of 1988 - 2005.Together with the number of investment projects, the amount of registered
capital for licensed projects increased rapidly in the first half of the 1990s, which was
generally referred to as the ‘investment boom’ period in Vietnam. Compared to the
dramatic increase in registered capital, actual implementation remained far lower. The
amount of registered capital peaked in the 1995 and 1996 and dropped sharply
subsequently when the Asian economic crisis began to seriously impact on Vietnam. The
FDI inflow started to pick up again as countries in the region recovered from the crisis
and together with the signing of the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement. Although
not shown here in the above Figure, the trend of FDI inflow in Vietnam surges again with
the accession of the country into the WTO. According to recently released statistics by
the Government Statistical Office (GSO, 2006), 797 FDI projects with a total registered
capital of US$ 7.57 billion were licensed in 2006 across 43 provinces in the country. In
the first three month in 2007, the result was even more spectacular with over 300 FDI
projects and US$ 2.5 billion registered capital37.
In addition, the geographical and distributions of FDI by sector have also been
improved. At the early days, FDI projects were usually carried out in such key economic
areas with adequate infrastructure facilities and favorable administrative procedures as
Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai province, Binh Duong province, and Ba Ria – Vung Tau
province in the South, and Ha Noi Capital, Hai Duong province, Vinh Phuc province, Hai
37

Foreign direct investment in Vietnam: An overview and analysis the determinants of spatial distribution
across provinces by Nguyen, Ngoc Anh and Nguyen, Thang - Development and Policies Research Center 10 June 20. Source: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1921/1/MPRA_paper_1921.pdf
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Phong province, and Quang Ninh province in the North, FDI projects are now spreading
out to other areas too, such as centrally-administered cities of Can Tho in the South, Da
Nang in the Centre as a result of improvements in infrastructures and the decentralization
policy of the government. FDI projects by sector have been also diversified, albeit at a
modest percentage, from industrial sector to service sector and agricultural sector.
According to official statistics released by Foreign Investment Agency – the Ministry of
Planning and Investment of Vietnam, the distribution of FDI projects by sector for the
1988 – April 2006 are as follows: (1) Industry and Construction: 4,255 projects,
accounting for 61%; (2) Agriculture, forestry, and fishery: 798 projects, accounting for
7%; (3) Service: 1.237 projects, accounting for 32%.
Figure 6 Distributions of FDI Projects By Sector

According to official statistics by the Government Statistical Office (GSO) and
MPI, all 64 provinces in Vietnam have received FDI though uneven. As shown in
Figure 7, the South East region (covering Ho Chi Minh city and its surrounding
provinces) accounts for the largest share of FDI. In the North, Hanoi and neighboring
provinces account for the send largest share of FDI, leaving a very small proportion for
other regions. This pattern is due to the fact that Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are the two
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main economic hubs of the country. The concentration of FDI in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh
City has been attributed to the increased cost of living and doing business in the two
cities. This has led to a tendency that foreign investors are looking elsewhere for the
investment location. In addition, the local governments in these provinces have now
realized the importance of FDI and are actively attracting inward FDI in their respective
regions/provinces.
Figure 7 Regional FDI by number of projects and register capital

Source: Foreign direct investment in Vietnam: An overview and analysis the
determinants of spatial distribution across provinces by Nguyen, Ngoc Anh and Nguyen,
Thang - Development and Policies Research Center - 10 June 20.
Available: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1921/1/MPRA_paper_1921.pdf
Furthermore, the climate of investment in Vietnam with more incentives has been
attracting foreign investments from wider regions than South East Asia as compared to
that at the very beginning. The following table provides more information on the
development of FDI, regarding capital commitments and disbursements as well as
country classification.
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Also, from the table below, Taiwan ranks 1st for foreign investors in Vietnam with
1,465 projects at US$ 2,757,467,536 as realized capital while Malaysia ranks 10th with
189 projects at US$ 816,167,420 as realized capital.
Table 5 Top Ten Foreign Investors in the Period 1988 – 4/2006 (Projects in operation)
Rank
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10

Countries and
Territories
Taiwan
Singapore
Japan
South Korea
Hong Kong
British
Virgin
Islands
France
Holland
USA
Malaysia
Sum up
Others
Total

Number of
Projects
1,465
410
642
1,125
365
260
170
62
279
189

Registered
Capital (USD)
7,909,737,514
7,700,122,233
6,731,989,233
5,787,353,991
4,361,848,910
2,766,568,591

Legal Capital
(USD)
3,442,195,304
2,866,013,367
3,053,044,739
2,418,135,982
1,695,540,203
1,038,768,597

Realized
Capital (USD)
2,757,467,536
3,454,289,236
4,158,985,2381
2,355,148,236
1,883,945,651
1,228,728,662

2,188,897,993
2,014,219,210
1,874,158,897
1,578,252,072
4,967 42,913,148,788
1,293 10,560,209,570
6,260 53,473,358,358

1,332,391,280
1,243,770,774
1,091,620,293
712,343,595
18,893,824,134
4,753,112,831
23,646,936,965

1,044,194,345
1,746,292,712
724,400,074
816,167,426
20,169,619,668
5,409,348,678
25,578,968,346

Source: Presentation on Business and Investment in Vietnam by Dr. Nguyen Thi Bich
Van – Deputy Director General of Foreign Investment Agency – The Ministry of
Planning and Investment of Vietnam.
As empirically presented above, FDI inflows in Vietnam are estimated as a means
to meet the requirement capital as well as to transfer new technologies during their
transitional periods as argued by the Neoclassical model that the country is further
promoting FDI for the sectors in high technology and information technology, new
materials and new energy, vegetation and live stock breeding, farming and processing
agricultural, forestry, and aqua-cultural products, infrastructure development, healthcare
and education. Take the excellent example of Intel Cooperation U.S.A with its expansion
in capital up to US$ 1 billion from its original capital at US$ 300 million as announced in
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Nov 2006 for the Ho Chi Minh City-based factory38. Therefore, FDI has a positive impact
on economic growth of Vietnam with capital and employment factors combined.
Regardless of the current global financial crisis, Vietnam remains a stable
environment for FDI as Prime Minister (PM) Nguyen Tan Dung made a statement at
Boao Forum for Asia39 as follows:
Vietnam will remain a dynamic economy and stable destination for investors,
despite the global financial crisis, said Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung at the
Bo’ao Forum for Asia (BFA) in China last week. The PM said Vietnam had
grown 6.2 percent in 2008, down from 8.2 percent in 2007, and has political and
economic stability that is a strong base for inward investors. In 2008, foreign
direct investment reached US$64 billion, three times more than in 2007.
Addressing the closing event of the three-day summit on April 19 in Hainan
Province, PM Dung asserted that “The BFA is an ideal setting for Asian
politicians, academics and businesspeople to share experiences and ideas for
effective regional cooperation. Asia’s traditional values, lessons learnt from the
East Asia economic crisis in the late 1990s, and strong determination would help
the region to become a “new driving force” for the world’s economic
development, said PM Dung. In order to improve the economic situation,
Vietnam will closely work with Asian to boost regional cooperation, especially in
38
39

Source: http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/20061110corp.htm
Boao Forum for Asia (Chinese: 博鳌亚洲论坛; pinyin: Bó'áo Yàzhōu Lùntán), abbreviated as BFA, is a

non-governmental, not-for-profit international organization modelled after the World Economic Forum in
Davos, Switzerland. As a non-government, non-profit international organization, Boao Forum For Asia
(BFA) is a prestigious forum for leaders in government, business and academia in Asia and other continents
to share visions on the most pressing issues in this dynamic region and the world at large. The Forum is
committed to promoting regional economic integration and bringing Asian countries even closer to their
development goals. Initiated in 1998 by Fidel V. Ramos, former President of the Philippines, Bob Hawke,
former Prime Minister of Australia, and Morihiro Hosokawa, former Prime Minister of Japan, Boao Forum
for Asia was formally inaugurated in February 2001. The founding of BFA was driven by the People's
Republic of China and founded by 26 Australasian states on 27 February 2001. The organisation held its
first meeting from April 12-13, 2002. It has its fixed address in Bo'ao, Hainan, China, although the
Secretariat is based in Beijing. The BFA holds a high-level annual forum for government, business, experts,
and scholars at Boao, with the focus of discussion on economics, integration, cooperation, society, and
environment.
Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boao_Forum_for_Asia
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the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). It will speed up the construction of
economic corridors and help realize the GMS Agreement on cross-border
transportation40.

As argued by the Neo-classical model, privatization is another area for developing
countries to rely on achieving economic growth. How does Vietnam carry out the process
of privatization?
4.1.3. Privatization
As mentioned earlier, Vietnam has realized the importance on privatization
attached to economic development. Vietnam has shown its positive manner in the process
of facilitating the development of privately-owned enterprises (POE) and reforming stateowned enterprises (SOE).
Table 6 Private Sector’s Share in 1998 GDP (Percent)

As stated in “An Informal Economic Report of the World Bank Consultative
Meeting Group for Vietnam, Ha Noi, December 14-15, 1999”, there were some key
factors about the Private Sector in Vietnam : The share of the private sector in total GDP

40

Available
investors.htm

at

:

http://www.vietnewsonline.vn/News/Politics/5883/Vietnam-PM-reassures-foreign-
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in 1999 was 51%. During the 1995 – 1998 period, the domestic private sector grew at 9%
per year. Less than half of manufacturing GDP was produced by private firms, but the
share was increasing, with the domestic private sector dominating that share. Private
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in manufacturing, especially the larger
ones, were highly export-oriented. Foreign invested enterprises had an important role to
play for economic development by employing 300,000 workers. The domestic private
sector was by far the most labor-intensive. Under this condition, Vietnam had been
actively carrying out the development of its private sector with very encouraging results:
(1) For six years of development, there were 180.000 new enterprises being established
with capital of US$ 15 billion from 2000 to 2005; (2) The number of private enterprises
registered for export-import trade was increased by 5 times up to 20,000 by 2005; (3)
Private sector still enjoyed the highest growth and increasing shares in the national
economy: 48.5 % in total GDP.
Figure 8 Industrial Employments by Sector in the period 1997 – 1998

The Enterprise Law, taking effect in 1999, has also been amended quite a number
of times. It has been improved a lot with business registration simplified considerably by
abolishing thousands of sub-licenses; improving services at business registration offices;
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clarifying requirements; and disseminating clear information to businesses on their rights
and obligations in comparison with high costs and complicated process that a potential
business had to submit 20 different type of documents, get 30 seals, wait for 3 months,
and pay about US$ 700 for a licensing process in addition to more sub-licenses being
required for actual activities as applied by the Enterprise Law before 1999.
Private enterprises, whose activities were negligible in 1993, now account for
over half of the investments made each year. The equitization process cut the number of
state-owned enterprises by more than half, from 3786 to 1720, over the past nine years,
although not across all sectors. This has created increased space for the expansion of
private firms. Large state-owned enterprises and state-owned commercial banks are now
lined up for equitization, whereas remaining ownership rights by the state are being
transferred out of ministries and provinces to avoid the conflict of interest between
ownership and regulation. As the private sector expands rapidly, both domestic and
foreign-invested firms have connected solidly with global markets. Private firms now
contribute 65 percent of manufactured products and over 70 percent of non-oil exports.
Vietnam is more and more an integral part of international production and distribution
chains41.
4.1.4. Official Development Assistance
The fast-growing economic development of Vietnam is also partly thanks to
sources of Official Development Assistance, commonly known as ODA. The country has
been receiving from donor countries and multilateral organizations. Simply put by
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IDA at work: Vietnam – Laying Foundation for Steady Growth “ The private sector has emerged as the
driver of growth, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/IDA-Vietnam.pdf
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Classical and Neo-Classical Theories, ODA is provided to cover three gaps: Savings –
Investment Gap; Foreign Exchange Gap; Technological Gap. ODA has contributed to
11% of Vietnam’s investment and 17% of government investment: Japanese ODA
accounted for 28.8% of total committed ODA and 36.2% of disbursed ODA. Japanese
ODA has contributed to 4% of Vietnam’s investment and 6.2% of government
investment. Sectoral contribution of ODA includes: Transportation, Power generation,
Education, Urban Infrastructure and hence helped to attract FDI Factually. Vietnam has
been receiving a considerable amount of ODA as shown in the below figure42.
Figure 9

A Glimpse of ODA in Vietnam from 1993 to 2006
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In 2007, international donors pledged to offer Vietnam nearly 4.45 billion U.S.
dollars in official development assistance (ODA), up from 3.7 billion dollars in 2006.
This time, they have committed a record level of ODA for Vietnam, which "proves the
close cooperation between the Vietnamese government and donors," Vietnamese Deputy
Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem said at the 13th Consultative Group (CG) Meeting,
42

Predictability and Stability of ODA Flows - The Case of Vietnam by Dr. Pham Hoang Mai – Head of
Japan and Northeast Asia Division – Foreign Economic Relations Department – Ministry of Planning and
Investment
of
Vietnam,
www.un.org/ecosoc/newfunct/3.%20Viet%20Nam%20%20Pham%20Hoang%20Mai.ppt
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adding that the government has pledged to effectively use the financial assistance. Of the
pledged amount, 1.14 billion dollars came from the Asian Development Bank, 890
million dollars from the World Bank, 890.3 million dollars from Japan, and 370.4 million
dollars from France. Vietnamese Minister of Planning and Investment Vo Hong Phuc
said Vietnam will use soft loans among the pledged ODA to finance projects on
developing infrastructure works, including roads, seaports, airports, power plan, and
water supplies.
Undoubtedly, the above achievements in economic development have come from
the country’s active participations in the regional and global economic institutions,
namely: the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN)43, Asia-Pacific
Cooperation (APEC)44, and the World Trade Organization (WTO)45. In short, these are
the factors that have led to economic development.

43
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok
by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar
on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. As of 2006, the ASEAN region has a population of
about 560 million, a total area of 4.5 million square kilometers, a combined gross domestic product of
almost US$ 1,100 billion, and a total trade of about US$ 1,400 billion, available at:
http://www.asean.org/64.htm.

44

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, is the premier forum for facilitating economic growth,
cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region .APEC is the only inter governmental
grouping in the world operating on the basis of non-binding commitments, open dialogue and equal respect
for the views of all participants. Unlike the WTO or other multilateral trade bodies, APEC has no treaty
obligations required of its participants. Decisions made within APEC are reached by consensus and
commitments are undertaken on a voluntary basis. APEC has 21 members - referred to as "Member
Economies" - which account for approximately 40.5%1 of the world's population, approximately 54.2%1 of
world GDP and about 43.7%2 of world trade. APEC's 21 Member Economies are Australia; Brunei
Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of
Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Republic of the Philippines; The
Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States of America; Viet Nam, available
at: http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html
45

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the
rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of
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4.2 Joining ASEAN
With the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer troops from Cambodia in
September 1989, and the conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991, the
normalization of relations between ASEAN and Vietnam proceeded. Detecting genuine
changes in Hanoi’s domestic and international priorities, ASEAN became more proactive
in engaging Vietnam with a view to admitting the country into the ranks of the
organization. In 1991, for example, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad stated
that differences in socio-political systems between Vietnam and the ASEAN states would
not prevent it from joining the Association. ASEAN countries thought that it was
necessary to bring Vietnam into the organization in due course for the below reasons.
Firstly, with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
it seemed an appropriate time to reach out to its erstwhile opponent and end the
ideological divisions engendered by the Cold War. From 1991 (the year the Soviet Union
collapsed) to 1995 (the year Vietnam joined ASEAN), Vietnam managed to find new
sources of aid, trade and investment to replace that lost from the Soviet bloc, when
Vietnam faced severe economic difficulties and resultant political challenges to regime
legitimacy, and when the ASEAN states’ economic success stories had become widely
apparent, the Vietnamese leadership was more willing to accept new thinking and learn
from non-socialist developmental models. As a result, joining ASEAN would facilitate a

the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and
services,
exporters,
and
importers
conduct
their
business,
available
at:
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm
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smooth transition to a market economy. In November 1994, former Deputy Foreign
Minister Vu Khoan wrote as follows:

With the October 1991 Paris Agreement on the overall political solution to the
Cambodia problem, the key obstacles to Vietnam-ASEAN relations over the last
10 years was removed. Relations between Vietnam and ASEAN members could
thus rapidly develop bilaterally and multilaterally. In other words, membership of
ASEAN did not radically alter the dynamics of Vietnam-ASEAN cooperation46.

According to Gareth Porter47, former Foreign Minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Co
Thach, was among the first Vietnamese leaders to study the merits of the market. Porter
observed that the foreign minister utilized this new knowledge to initiate debate in
Vietnam on the need for coexistence between capitalist and socialist systems and
participation in the global capitalist economy. This led to the adoption of a resolution at
the Sixth Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) Central Committee Plenum in July 1984
which officially laid down the task of actively participating in the global capitalist
system. The resolution continued to serve as one of the most important documents
concerning the policy of economic reform that was officially adopted by the CPV Sixth
National Congress in 1986. The CPV Political Report argued: The scientific and
technological revolution, the globalization of production forces, and the emergence of a
single world market are the major characteristics of our era, forcing all the countries to
readjust their economies in order to seek and protect their optimal niches in the
international division of labor. And the internationalization of production forces has led
to the inevitable need for economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence among
46

Nguyen Vu Tung, “ Vietnam’s Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation”, Contemporary
Southeast Asia Vol. 29, No. 3 (2007), pp. 483–505, © 2007 ISEAS, http://www.vietstudies.info/kinhte/VN_Asean_JSEAS.pdf
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Porter, Gareth. “The Transformation of Vietnam’s Worldview: From Two Camps to Interdependence”.
Contemporary Southeast Asia 12, no. 1 (June 1990): 1 – 19
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countries of different political systems48.Vietnam was admitted into this regional bloc as
an official member in July 1995.
Secondly, as ASEAN was eager to enlarge the organization to enable it to speak
for the whole of Southeast Asia, Vietnam seemed to provide a good starting point for the
subsequent entry of Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. As a result, ASEAN would play a
pivotal role in ensuring peace, stability and, to a lesser extent, prosperity in Southeast
Asia and a larger role in the Asia-Pacific region.
Thirdly, Vietnam’s membership to ASEAN has helped secure the legitimacy of
the CPV as it has been able to bring about peace, stability and prosperity to Vietnam in
the aftermath of the Cold War. As Prime Minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Tan Dung, said,

With the cooperation with ASEAN, we can further consolidate an
environment of peace and stability, continuously expand multifaceted
cooperation with regional countries, especially in economic terms, and
enhance Vietnam’s international standing, creating more conditions for
Vietnam deeper integration into the Asia Pacific and global economies.
The table below shows trading activities between Vietnam and ASEAN from 1995 to
200449:
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Table 7 Trade Turnover between Vietnam and Other ASEAN Countries
Year

Exports
Imports
Total
Balance of Trade
(US$ Billions)
(US$ Billions)
(US$ Billions)
(US$ Billions)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Turnover
%
Turnover
%
Turnover
%
Turnover
%
1995
1,112
20.4
2,378
29.1
3,490
23.9
(-1,266)
46.7
1996
1,364
18.8
2,788
24
4,152
33.4
(-1,424)
36.6
1997
1,911
20.8
3,166
27.3
5,077
25.5
(-1,255)
52.1
1998
2,372
25.3
3,749
32.6
6,122
29.7
(-1,377)
64.3
1999
2,463
21.3
3,288
28
5,751
24.9
(-0,825)
411
2000
2,612
18
4,519
29
7,131
23.7
(-1,907)
165.2
2001
2,551
17
4,226
26.1
6,777
21.8
(-1,675)
147.5
2002
2,426
14.5
4,770
24.2
7,196
19.7
(-2,344)
77.8
2003
2,958
14.7
5,957
24
8,915
19.8
(-2,999)
62.5
2004
3,874
14.6
7,766
24.7
11,640
19.8
(-3,892)
81.1
Source:
National
Committee
for
International
Economic
Cooperation
at
http://www.nciec.gov.vn/index.nciec?68
(3) Vietnam’s exports to ASEAN countries as a percentage of its total foreign
(5) Vietnam’s imports from ASEAN countries as a percentage of its total imports
(7) Vietnam’s trade with ASEAN countries as a percentage of total foreign trade
(9) Vietnam’s trade balance with ASEAN countries as a percentage of total foreign trade.

In 1994, ASEAN countries accounted for 30 per cent of Vietnam’s total foreign
trade, and 30 per cent of foreign direct investment (FDI). Indeed the level of economic
interaction between Vietnam and its ASEAN partners shrank after it had joined the
organization with the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In 2003, trade with
ASEAN countries dropped to 20 per cent of Vietnam’s total trade. Investments from
ASEAN in 1997 accounted for 23.4 per cent of total foreign investments in Vietnam.
This figure fell to 17.6 per cent in 1999 rising to about 20 per cent by 2007. The table
does not really see the real benefits from joining ASEAN. If we take a closer look at the
agricultural sector, however, Vietnam’s participation in ASEAN shows considerable
benefits.
In 2003, Vietnam’s rice exports to ASEAN reached US$388.7 million, accounting
for 66.4 percent of the total agricultural export value of the country to the region. Coffee,
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rubber and peanuts were the next largest agricultural exports to ASEAN. Each of them
accounted for around 6.5-8 percent of the total agricultural export value of the country to
ASEAN in 2003. The agricultural exports of ASEAN to Vietnam, however, have been
modest. The country imported agricultural inputs (mainly urea fertilizer) rather than
agricultural products. In 2005, Vietnam imported approximately 1.7 million tons of
fertilizer, in which urea contributed 550,000 tons worth US$ 142 million from ASEAN.
Vietnam can further expand its agricultural exports to ASEAN after the full
Common Effective Preferential Tariffs Agreement, CEPT, has been completed, or
beyond 2010. This is because farm products in the Sensitive List (SL) of many enlarged
ASEAN countries are major agricultural exports of Vietnam50. For example, rice is on
the SL for Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, and the Philippines, while raw and
primary processed coffee is on the list for Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia and
Thailand. As long as tariff rates are reduced ton0-5 percent for these products, export
opportunities for Vietnam will be widened in ASEAN markets51.
To conclude, Vietnam has benefited immensely from joining ASEAN and derives
a great deal of satisfaction from being a member for the following factors: (1) ASEAN is
a large market with around 500 million people; (2) ASEAN is the region very close in
terms of geographical distance; (3) The people in the region have similar food
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The CEPT is the mechanism by which tariffs on goods traded within the ASEAN region, which meet a
40% ASEAN content requirement, will be reduced to 0-5% by the year 2002/2003 (2006 for Vietnam,
2008 for Laos and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia). The tariff reductions are moving ahead on both the
"fast" and "normal" tracks. Tariffs on goods in the fast track were largely reduced to 0-5% by 2000. Tariffs
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consumption habits; and (4) The average income level in ASEAN countries is not very
high compared to other regions. More importantly, Vietnam’s membership to ASEAN
paved the way for the country to join other regional and global economic institutions52.
4.3 Joining APEC
Three years after joining ASEAN, Vietnam made another successful move to join
a larger regional body economically and politically referred to as Asia –Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) in November 1998 and showed itself to be a very active and
potential member by hosting APEC 2006 Summit in the capital of Hanoi.
APEC member economies are now the largest investors in Vietnam, representing
65.6% of the total investment capital. Of the 14 countries and territories investing
more than US$ 1 billion each in Vietnam, 10 are APEC members, with a
combined investment capital of US$ 39.5 billion, accounting for 62.7% of the
total investment capital. The biggest official development assistance for Vietnam
also comes from APEC, with Japan being the largest donor. Up to 72.8% of
Vietnam's exports come to APEC members. Vietnam's imports from APEC
member economies are the biggest, worth US$ 25.3 billion, or 79.2% of the total
import spending. Of more than 2.9 million international tourists coming to
Vietnam in 2004, 2.2 million came from APEC member economies, accounting
for 75.7% of the total. The APEC 2006 summit will be the biggest international
event to be held in Vietnam. The week-long gathering of the leaders of 21
member economies from November 12 to 19 in Hanoi will be the key activity.
Vietnam's priorities for APEC 2006 would be APEC's main pillars and would
also be the continuation of the themes of previous and succeeding summits53.

According to then Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, Chairman of the APEC
2006 National Committee, hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum 2006 would serve
as a valuable opportunity for Vietnam. First, Vietnam would make positive contributions
to the development of APEC, making it more substantive and efficient. Second, Vietnam
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would further nurture an image of dynamism, hospitality and cultural identity of the
country. Third, through APEC, Vietnam would promote relations with all other APEC
members and accumulate more support from the forum’s members for the country's bid
to join the World Trade Organization. In addition, Vietnamese enterprises would have the
chance to meet foreign partners and develop business activities54.
Trade liberalization is the most important content of APEC. As the host country,
Vietnam would help APEC participate more actively in the process. At the Doha round in
Hong Kong in 2005, some initial results were attained. However, the round was not yet
completed. APEC 2006 focused on the Doha negotiations. Though without predetermination, APEC 2006 had a certain relation to Vietnam’s accession to WTO. The
negotiation on Vietnam's WTO membership was proceeding very well. Vietnam had just
concluded the negotiation with New Zealand. Of the APEC members, there remained
only two members - the US and Mexico - who had yet to conclude WTO bilateral
negotiations with Vietnam. Progress had also been made recently in the bilateral talks
with the United States. Hosting APEC 2006 was a driving force for Vietnam in the
process. In addition, as a less developed country among APEC members, Vietnam
expected that by developing trade and investment, co-operating in economy, science and
technology with other APEC members, it could develop faster. The gap between Vietnam
and other APEC members would be narrowed down. At APEC 2006, Vietnam held major
international events to further promote the country's image to stimulate foreign
investment attraction and tourism.
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APEC 2006 presents a big opportunity for Vietnam's international integration APEC and Vietnam-APEC
2006 summit, available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/nr041126171753/ns060509095637
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4.4 Joining WTO
Joining APEC actually was not a final goal for Vietnam to fully integrate into the
world’s economy. In order to trade further, Vietnam participated in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) as the 150th member on November, 7th, 2006 after more than ten
years of negotiations with other active members of the body. This is the only way out for
Vietnam to freely trade with the rest of the world as Dr. Vo, Tong Xuan, President of An
Giang University, Long Xuyen, Vietnam, has indicated that joining the world trade body
will create opportunities for the agricultural sector, the industrial sector, and the service
sector to have further access to the world market. More FDI projects will be operated in
industrial and manufacturing establishments nationwide. More foreign-based service
industries in such fields as information and communications technology, advertising,
foreign financial services, and advisory and auditing services will be established55.
WTO accession can be expected to facilitate further global integration over the
medium term, improving Vietnamese exporters’ access to foreign markets. This should
be particularly beneficial for the key textile and footwear export industries because
Vietnam can now compete on an equal footing with other WTO member countries on
these industries. The benefits to export performance, however, could take some time to be
fully realized… Import barriers in most other sectors will also decline, albeit in a more
gradual fashion. Vietnam has committed to bound tariff rates on most products ranging
from zero to 35 percent, although tariffs on cars and motorbikes are to remain somewhat
higher, and certain sensitive products (such as eggs, tobacco, sugar, and salt) will be
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further protected with tariff quotas. Reductions in most bound rates— from 17.4 percent
on average in 2007 to 13.6 percent by 2019—are to be phased in over periods of up to 12
years56.
From a broader perspective, WTO accession should have largely positive
macroeconomic effects. While the reduction in import tariffs can be expected initially to
lower import duty receipts by some 0.3 to 0.6 percent of GDP, this should be tempered
over time as the removal of trade barriers spurs import growth. With exports continuing
to grow rapidly as access to foreign markets improves, and with continued dynamism of
foreign investment, the overall balance of payments should remain strong. Increasing
access to cheaper imports should also help contain inflation, which, at 7.5 percent in
2006, is still higher than in other emerging markets in Asia. IMF staff estimates
(Tumbarello, 2007) also point to welfare gains from trade liberalization, rising over time
to reach some 0.6–1.2 percent of GDP a year by 2019.
Vietnam is also likely to derive important productivity gains from trade
liberalization and other market-friendly reforms to be introduced in the context of WTO
accession. A new law providing a common regulatory framework for domestic and
foreign enterprises has been introduced, and Vietnam has also moved to harmonize its
rules on trading rights for foreign and domestic traders. WTO accession could also serve
as a catalyst to promote restructuring of unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Increased competition with foreign banks can also be expected to prod the government to
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speed up the restructuring of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and the
implementation of its banking sector reform roadmap. These reforms should help
increase the efficiency and profitability of investment. Indeed, the prospect of accession
has already bolstered the investment climate, and. With FDI approvals reaching a record
$10 billion in 2006, Vietnam was well-placed to take full advantage of its ongoing global
integration to sustain the rapid pace of its economic growth.
WTO accession is, of course, not a panacea and presents challenges as well as
opportunities. Heavily-protected industries and SOE sectors, notably auto-assembly and
motorbike plants, and the financial sector, will need to undertake significant reforms to
remain viable. In this process, there may be a compression of profit margins and,
possibly, labor-shedding or even bankruptcies in loss-making SOEs and declining
industries. Although adverse effects should be manageable as long as more efficient
sectors offer growing employment opportunities, it will be important to put in place
adequate retraining programs and social safety nets to minimize dislocations.
The authorities will also need to resist the temptation to support financially those
industries with declining profitability. Such support, which could take the form of fiscal
incentives or directed lending by state-owned banks, could turn out to be very costly
especially if, in the end, these industries are found to be non-viable. The below figure
serves as an illustration for Vietnamese economic perspectives from joining the world
trade body:
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Figure 10 Vietnam: Indicators for Trade Openness

Source: Regional and Economic Outlook for Asia and Pacific – Issue April 2007 – IMF
Vietnam’s participation in the world trade body has significant impacts on the
region, and the rest of the world as thoroughly analyzed in “ Regional and Economic
Outlook for Asia and Pacific – Issue April 2007 – IMF”57 as below:
For the region, the NIEs58 are likely to gain from Vietnam’s accession, as they
have invested heavily in the country and do not have the same comparative advantage as
Vietnam in their exports. However, major exporters of textiles and garments (such as
Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka) may face new competitive
challenges as the end of the textile quota implies increased market access of Vietnamese
products in the United States. In addition, as Vietnamese producers penetrate a broader
range of manufacturing sectors, including low-end electronics, the rest of the ASEAN-559
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“Newly industrialized economies (NIEs)” refers to Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan
Province of China.
59
“ASEAN-5” refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
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are likely to come under increasing pressure to move towards the production of higher
value-added products. With respect to foreign investment, it is difficult to ascertain how
WTO membership will affect FDI in other Asian countries. Vietnam has already
established itself as an appealing destination for foreign investors prior to accession,
including in the information technology sector. Also, the reduction of its MFN tariffs,
together with improved access to foreign markets, should enhance its integration into
regional production networks. Cost reductions from increasing FDI in Vietnam could
thus improve the profitability of regional networks.
For the rest of the world, industrial countries are likely to accrue considerable net
gains from Vietnam’s WTO accession. Consumers in the United States, European Union
(EU), and Japan60 can be expected to reap growing gains in welfare from the continuing
integration of Vietnam’s productive and low-cost labor force into the global economy. In
addition, as Vietnam transitions towards middle income status, there should be increasing
scope for an expansion of industrial countries’ exports in technology intensive
manufactures and high-end services (e.g., finance), in which advanced economies still
have a comparative advantage. While preliminary data suggest that, in the short run, FDI
is set to increase most strongly in the sectors in which import barriers will fall most
rapidly (as in textiles), over time, it is likely that there will also be growing foreign
investor interest in higher-value-added manufacturing and services sectors.
The above foreign policy with trading activities has brought significant impacts
on both economic development and human development of Vietnam as theoretically
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applied from some of the most relevant frameworks from the literature “ Overview –
Attacking Poverty: Opportunity, Empowerment, and Security”,

concretely:

(1) A

strategy for poverty reduction - In the way of promoting opportunity with the emphasize
placed on the centrality of materials, including jobs, credit, roads, electricity, markets for
their produce, and the schools, water, sanitation, and health services that underpin the
health and skills essential for work; (2) From strategy to action – Developing countries
need to prepare their own mix of policies to reduce poverty, reflecting national priorities
and local realities. Choices will depend on the economic, sociopolitical, structural, and
cultural context of individual countries – indeed, individual communities; (3) Expanding
into international markets – International markets offer huge opportunities for jobs and
income growth – in agriculture, industry, and services. All countries had major reductions
in income poverty have made use of international trade”61.
4.5 Achievements in Human Development
Vietnam has been keen to work closely with multilateral international
development agencies, such as IMF, WB, and UNDP for human development. In this
sense, poverty reduction, education development, and health development have emerged
as major tasks for human development of Vietnam. Especially, education and health are
the two basic objectives of development; they are important ends in themselves. Health is
central to well-being, and education is essential for a satisfying and rewarding life; both
are fundamental to the broader notion of expanded human capacities that lie at the heart
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of the meaning of development. At the same time, education plays a key role in the
ability of developing country to absorb modern technology and to develop the capacity
for self-sustaining growth and development. Moreover, health is a prerequisite for
increases in productivity, while successful education relies on adequate health as well.
Thus both health and education can also be seen as vital components of growth and
development62.
This part of the thesis presents how Vietnam has been able to achieve poverty
reduction, education development, and health development by working closely with and
receiving strong supports from the UN development agencies for Vietnam’s national
development plans in these sectors.
4.5.1 Poverty reduction
Regardless of achievements in economic development as well presented above,
Vietnam remains a poor country with low per capita income (per capita GDP is estimated
at about US$400 in the year 2000) and the poverty rate is still high. The Government of
Vietnam recognizes this problem and believes that a strategy focused on achieving high
and sustainable growth is a key to narrowing the economic development gap between
Vietnam and other countries in the region and the world, while at the same time
generating sufficient resources to raise the welfare and living standards of the people, as
well as reduce poverty and create social equity. In order to maintain rapid and sustainable
economic growth, and implement effectively the policy on poverty reduction, the
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Government of Vietnam developed the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth
Strategy (CPRGS).
CPRGS is an action program that translates the Government’s Ten-Year Socioeconomic Development Strategy, Five-Year Socio-economic Development Plan as well
as other sectoral development plans into concrete measures with well-defined road maps
for implementation. The purpose of CPRGS is to achieve economic growth and poverty
reduction objectives. CPRGS is closely related to the national annual socio-economic
development plans and those plans developed by different ministries, agencies and
sectors. The national annual socio-economic development plan that is passed by the
National Assembly serves as a tool for bringing the policies and measures contained in
the CPRGS into practice63. This CPRGS, approved by former Prime Minister Phan Van
Khai in November 2003, covers all general objectives, institutional arrangements,
policies and solutions of the 10-Year Strategy and 5- Year Plan into detailed specific
actions plans. In policy, the CPRGS has the following six parts:
Part I: Socio-Economic Setting, Current Poverty Situation, Achievements and
Challenges.
Part II: Objectives and Tasks of Socio – Economic Development and Poverty Reduction
for the Period up to 2005 and 2010.
Part III: Create Environment for Rapid and Sustainable Growth, and for Poverty
Reduction.
Part IV: Large-scale Infrastructure Development for Growth and Reduction of Poverty.
Part V: Major Policies and Measures for the Development of Sectors and Industries to
Ensure Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth.
Part VI: Mobilization of Resources for Growth and Poverty Reduction.
By definition of the World Bank, those living less than $US 1 per day are
considered as poor. More specifically, it is measured in dollars with the same purchasing
63
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power as in the US, commonly known as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). However,
poverty line in Vietnam cannot be based on this estimation, for goods and services are
more expensive in the U.S. than those in Vietnam. In comparison, this measurement of
$US 1 per day is equivalent to 1/5 or 20 cents of a dollar. In fact, a new poverty line
developed by the National Poverty Reduction Program is defined at different levels
subject to specific areas/regions and to per capita income: VND 80,000 per month for
island areas and rural mountainous areas, VND 100,000 per month for rural plain areas,
and VND 150,000 per month in urban areas

for 2001 – 2005 period (note: $US 1

equivalent to VND 16,000 – exchange rate by Vietcombank). Poverty line in Vietnam
was 58.1% in 1993.
The CPRGS of Vietnam requires a very large amount of government spending
and other capital inflows from international borrowers and multilateral donors. To this
end, the country has been working closely with the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund as agencies for development in the fight against poverty.
Since resuming its operations in the country in 1993, the Bank has provided three
types of services to Vietnam: (1) design and finance development projects; (2) analytical
work, policy advice, and technical assistance; and (3) donor dialogue facilitator. As of
today, the Bank

has supported more than 50 projects to help Vietnam fight poverty

through finance for agriculture, infrastructure, health programs, schools, and other
essential needs.
This part of the thesis, however, discusses only one part of the Bank’s projects to
Vietnam through Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) in support of the country’s
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Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy. Initially, PRSCs supported
important reforms of Vietnam in trade integration with the global economy, private sector
development and public finance management reform. The PRSCs have become the main
vehicle for the Government and the donor community to discuss a wide range of policy
reforms. The PRSCs not only concentrate on poverty reduction but also help Vietnam in
a broad-based program to deal with difficulties faced by the country in transition to a
market-based economy. In this connection, the country has been receiving in seven
PRSCs from the Bank. Given below is a brief description of the 7 PRSCs.
Table 8: The Brief Description of the 7 Poverty Reduction Support Credits
Project(s)
PRSC 1
(June 2001)

PRSC 2
(June 2003)
No-interest Loan

Amount
Objectives/Benefits
US$ 250 million - Improve the climate for the private sector,
thereby generating jobs and higher wages;
- Reform State enterprises to improve efficiency
and free up fiscal resources for poverty reduction
program;
- Reconstruct the banking system to reduce the
risk of financial crisis, which could otherwise
undermine poverty reduction efforts;
- Integrate with the world economy to expand
labor-intensive exports; and
- Improve public expenditure management
US$ 100 million - Strengthen competition in the economy, harden
the budget constraint on state-owned enterprises,
and level the playing field for the private sector,
therefore leading to increased efficiency and job
creation;
- Promote investments in people through access
by the poor to health care, more secure asset
ownership in the form of land titles and greater
role of the public involvement in environment
management; and
- Increase efficiency and accountability in public
financial management and improve legal
transparency and accessibility, thus laying the
foundations for modern governance.
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PRSC 3
(June 2004)
No-interest Loan

US$ 100 million Help further reforms set out in the country’s
CPRGS in a plan to complete the transition to a
market economy; make development inclusive,
and to build a modern governance system.
PRSC 4
US$ 100 million Support
the country’s broad-based reform
(June 2005)
program, including completion of the transition to
a market economy, ensuring social inclusion and
strengthening governance.
PRSC 5
US$ 100 million - Help improve the regulatory framework for
(June 2006)
private development, and enhance transparency
No-interest loan
and accountability in state-owned enterprise
operations and in the banking-sector;
- Promote human development through upgrading
the quality of education, especially in poor zones,
promoting inclusive education for children living
with disabilities, improving the access of the poor
to health services, more sustainable management
of natural resources; and
- Build modern governance in public financial
management reform and in public resource
allocation.
PRSC 6
US$ 175 million Promote business development; preserve social
(June 2007)
inclusion, better manage natural resources and the
environment and to improve governance in
support of Vietnam’s efforts to become a middleincome country by the end of the decade.
PRSC 7
US$ 200 million Aim at supporting the implementation of the
( June 2008)
Approximate
Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) 2006
Estimated
- 2010
Source: The World Bank – Vietnam Poverty Reduction Support Credit Projects
As seen from the above table, the World Bank has sustained its credit supports to

Vietnam given the country’s steady performance in poverty reduction particularly and
economic reform generally for development policy as commented by Klaus Rohland,
former World Bank Country Director for Vietnam at the formal announcement of the
approval for the Third Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC 3),
The good macroeconomic situation and the continued progress in poverty
reduction confirm that the overall development strategy of Vietnam is going well.
Looking ahead the Government needs to continue its impressive reform program.
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Issues surrounding the financial sector and State-Owned Enterprises should be
high on the agenda.

The PRSCs worked for the CPRGS as a result in the country’s decline in poverty
rate down to 24.1 in 2004 from 28.9 percent in 2002, 37.4 percent in 1998, and 58.1
percent in 1993. In comparison between theory and practice related to poverty reduction
strategy suggested by the Bank and planned by the Government, the items from the above
table are well connected to those planned in the MDGs. In short, the campaign of poverty
reduction has gone alongside the attacking poverty recommendation of the Bank and the
MDGs.
Also, the Government of Vietnam has been cooperating with the IMF on the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). This PRGF is the IMF’s low-interest
lending facility for low-income countries. In theory, the IMF established PRGF in
September 1999 to make the objectives of poverty reduction and growth more central to
lending operations in its poorest member countries. PRGF-supported programs are
framed around comprehensive, country-owned Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. These
papers are prepared by governments with the active participation of civil society and
other development partners. The PRGF has three key features: (1) The Principle of broad
public participation and greater country ownership is central to the PRGF; (2) PRGFsupported programs reflect more closely each country’s poverty reduction and growth
priorities; and (3) PRGF-supported programs focus on strengthening governance in order
to assist countries’ efforts to design targeted and well-prioritized spending. In practice,
the Executive Board of the International Monetary approved on April 2001 in principle a
three-year arrangement for Vietnam under the PRGF in an amount of US$ 368 million.
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The first release of the loan under the PRGF was amounted to about US$ 53. The PRGF
loans carried an annual interest rate of 0.5 percent, and were payable over 10 years with a
51/2 – year grace period on principal payments. As an illustration, the PRGF helps
Vietnam to (1) Improve its competitiveness and attraction of foreign direct investment by
pursuing further economic integration through implementing commitments with key
trading partners. For example, Vietnam was committed to reduce tariffs under the
ASEAN Free Trade Area on the majority of tariff lines to 20% by 2003 and to 0-5
percent by 2006; (2) Reform the banking sector, aimed at enforcing better lending
discipline and transparency. In this way, each bank will undergo independent audits on
international accounting standards by year end; and (3) Tighten monetary policy with
interest rate policy to be made flexible and the exchange rate to be expectedly managed
more flexibly.
The above explanation gives a greater role to market forces and minimizes
administrative measures. The benefits brought about by the PRGF are significant as
stated by Shigemitsu Sugisaki, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chairman at the
IMF’s second review of Vietnam’s PRGF Program on June 21, 2002 as follows:
The Vietnamese authorities have continued to make progress in implementing
their three-year program, which seeks to improve competitiveness and spur
investment in order to foster high growth and rapid poverty reduction. Economic
performance under the first-year program was relatively strong and based on
generally sound macroeconomic policies and progress in structural reforms…
The authorities’ Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy has
been prepared in a commendable participatory process. Its successful
implementation will require careful prioritization and costing, strong expenditure
management and monitoring, and a full assessment of the social impact reform.
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More importantly, the CPRGS of Vietnam is in line with the MDGs64. In this
regard, Vietnam has received a very strong support from United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). Since 1993, UNDP has been helping the Government of Viet Nam
with its poverty and hunger reduction strategies and programs in leveling the economic
playing field through regulatory reforms to develop businesses that create domestic
employment and unleash the capacity of local entrepreneurs. UNDP has been working
closely with General Statistics Office (GSO) to improve its ability to collect and analyze
poverty data. UNDP provides technical support to the Government on its national
programs to improve the lives of people living in ethnic and mountainous regions of Viet
Nam. UNDP brings together and shares lessons learned from all its policies and programs
on issues such as gender, poverty targeting, decentralization and local governance,
infrastructure and credit for the poor.
With Vietnam’s efforts to integrate into the global economy as discussed earlier,
Vietnam has new opportunities for growth, but new challenges for poverty reduction. In
this setting, equitable growth, pro-poor policies and efforts to achieve the MDGs, remain
at the core of UNDP’s advocacy and programming in Vietnam — and an overarching
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goal in UNDP-Vietnamese cooperation65. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the
MDGs and the Vietnamese achievements.
Table 9 The Millennium Development Goals and The Vietnamese Achievements
The Millennium Development Goals
The Vietnamese Achievements
Goal 1 : Eradicate extreme poverty and The poverty rate fell from 58.1% in 1993 to
hunger by half between 1990 and 2015
24.1% in 2004 with nearly 60% of poor
household moving out of poverty.
Goal 2 : Achieve universal primary The complete rate of primary education
education by completing a full course of (from first to fifth grades) rose to 99.82%
primary schooling from boys and girls by in the academic year 2003-2004;
2015
particularly the rise was seen in the Central
Highlands and the Red Mekong Delta.
Goal 3 : Promote gender equality and The literacy rate of over 10 year-old
empower women by eliminating gender population was 92%, of which the rate for
disparity in primary and secondary women was 89.3% and for men 95% in
education and in all levels of education by 2002. Disparities between enrolment of
2015
boys and girls had been reduced at all
levels of education as of 2004: primary
level (girls: 47.6%; boys: 52.4%);
secondary level (girls:48.5%; boys: 51.5%)
Goal 4: Reduce by two-thirds of the under- Particular attention has been paid to
five child mortality rate between 1990 and healthcare of mothers and children with
encouraging results for the under-five
2015
mortality rate from 58% in 1990 to 31.5%
in 2004; for the under-one mortality from
44.4% in 1990 to 18% in 2004.
Goal 5: Improve maternal health by Priority has been given to maternal
reducing three -quarters the maternal healthcare during pregnancy and at delivery
mortality ratio between 1990 and 2015
with the maternal mortality rate decreasing
from 120/100,000 live births in 1990 to
85/100,000 live births in 2004.
Goal 6 : Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and - Combat HIV/AIDS : very difficult with
other diseases by having halted or begun to HIV cases of more than 15,000 each year in
reserve the spread by 2015
2001-2004 found in all 64 provinces/cities
(more financial investment : 45-50 VND
billion ) - Combat Malaria: effectively
controlled between 1995 and 2004 with
malaria case per 100,000 people decrease
by 4.5 times
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Goal
7:
Ensure
environmental - Increase forest cover from 27.2% in 1990
sustainability by reserving the loss of to 37% in 2004 through the Five Million
environmental resources
Hectares Reforestation Program – Have
more access to clean water for the rural
population from only 28% in 1996 to 58%
in 2004
Goal 8 : Develop a global partnership for - Inflows of Official Development
development
Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI)
Source: UNDP Publication – Vietnam achieving the Millennium Development Goals
With a very strong support from UNDP, Vietnam has remarkably achieved the
MDGs set by the United Nations. Though Vietnam is still faced with the threat of
HIV/AIDS spread, the country is committed to staying firm on this course by investing
more in prevention and treatment facilities as well as educational programs in order to
raise the public awareness of this deadly disease.
With all efforts Vietnam made as seen from the empirical evidences, the World Bank
estimates that 30 million people were lifted out of poverty within 10 years; the poverty
rate fell down as below.
Figure 11 Poverty Rate in Vietnam from 1993 to 2004

Source : Vietnam Poverty Update Report 2004
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As mentioned earlier, Vietnam achieved the annual growth rate of GDP at 7.3 since
2001. Vietnam is now considered as a success story for poverty reduction as indicated by
Mr. Ajay Chhibber, World Bank Country Director for Vietnam as below:
Although we have just arrived in Vietnam, we are very impressed by the initial
results of the PRSC. With US$150 million granted by the WB and US$22 million
provided by other donors in the first stage, now the program has so far received
another credit loan of US$175 million from the WB and US$195 million from
co-sponsors. The increase in the amount of aid as well as in the number of
sponsors has proved that the international community strongly supports the
Vietnamese government’s socio-economic plan and poverty reduction work. The
WB is expected to increase its contribution to the PRSC7 to US$200 million.66

The above achievements in MDGs and poverty reduction are also supported by the
Vietnam’ National Plans in education and health presented in the below parts.
4.5.2 Education development
Through implementation of the "open door” policy, the Vietnamese Government
has been strengthening international cooperation in education, particularly the program
"Education for All". International organizations, governments and non-government
organizations have provided significant supports to Vietnam during the past decade. The
focus of these supports has been on pie-primary education, on primary education, in the
program of illiteracy elimination and post illiteracy elimination and in regular education.
In the context of using resources provided by programs and projects, Vietnam has been
utilizing the opportunities kindly provided by international support to achieve the
objectives set by the program "Education for All' 67.
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At the World Education Conference in Dakar, Senegal in April 2000, all
governments, including Viet Nam, and the international donor community adopted the
"Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments"
and committed themselves to prepare and implement programs that were credible to
achieve goals set in the "Dakar Framework for Action".
The Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam, with technical assistance of
UNESCO since late 2001, completed the preparation of the "National Education for All
Action Plan 2003-2015" for Viet Nam. This Plan was approved by the Government on
the 2nd of July 2003. The "National Education for All Action Plan 2003-2015" is, on the
one hand, a government tool for adjusting policies at the macro level in the area of
Education for All and a framework for provinces and cities to develop their respective
provincial “Education for All” plans. On the other hand, this Plan is a framework for
guiding international organizations, bilateral donors and NGOs' financial and technical
support to Vietnam in order to accelerate and ensure the quality of Education for All
activities. The "National Education for All Action Plan 2003-2015" reflects the
realization of commitments that the Government of Viet Nam made at the Dakar Forum
to prepare a good quality, credible and feasible action plan.
The Plan has identified general goals, specific objectives and targets for subsectors of Education for All in Viet Nam for the period 2003-2015, including early
childhood care and education, primary education, lower secondary education and nonformal education. In addition, the Plan identifies action programs for achieving the
objectives of each of the above components. Moreover, the action plan also forecasts
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possibilities for resource mobilization from government, people as well as international
support towards achieving Viet Nam's Education for All goals until 201568. Vietnam’s
EFA has the following targets69 to achieve:
Target Group 1: Early Childhood Care and Education Access (ECCE) with the objectives
(1) to provide access to ECCE provision for 0 – 5 year old children, prioritizing ethnic
minorities and disadvantaged children; and (2) to ensure that all children complete oneyear of quality pre-school education as preparation for primary school.
Target Group 2: Primary Education with the objectives (1) to provide access to affordable
and quality education for all children, especially for ethnic minority, disadvantaged
groups and for girls; and (2) to ensure all children complete the full cycle of five grades
of primary education.
Target Group 3: Lower Secondary Education with the objectives (1) to extend access to
affordable and quality lower secondary education to all children, especially ethnic
minority, disadvantaged groups and girls; and (2) to ensure that all children complete the
full circle of four grades of lower secondary education.
Target Group 4: Non-formal education (NFE) with the objectives (1) to ensure that all
out-of-school youth (in primary and secondary school age) have education opportunities
to achieve; and (2) to ensure that all adults, especially women and disadvantaged groups
have access to free and quality literacy and post literacy programs and to affordable and
quality life skills programs lifelong learning opportunities.
WB showed a strong support for Vietnam’s EFA goals by a financing project
called “The Targeted Budget Support for National Education for All Plan Program
Project”. This project provided targeted budgetary support for selected subcomponents of
the Educational National Targeted Program (NTP), designed to enhance the quality of
basic education, and strengthened the administration of the Education National Targeted
Program.
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Plan

2003

–

2015,

available

at

Plan

2003

–

2015,

available

at

More specifically, the project supported the Government of Vietnam to make
progress towards the improvement of education service delivery through the
implementation of minimum quality standards, known as Fundamental School Quality
Levels (FQSL) in the primary subsector. During the life of the project, the share of
schools achieving these minimum education quality inputs would increase. In addition,
the project also promoted an overarching policy framework in education finance,
planning and governance that will act as an enabling environment for improved service
delivery70. The project is briefed as follows:
Source:
BORROWER/RECIPIENT
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
BILATERAL SOURCES: Belgium, CIDA, DFID and European
Commission
Total
Approval date
Closing

($m.)
315.0
50.00
85.00
450.00
28 June 2005
30 June 2009

Because "Education for All" is especially important in human development, the
Vietnamese Government and people have been heavily investing staff resources,
financial resources and intellectual endeavor in every component of "Education for All".
In Vietnam the budget for Primary Education represents approximately one third of the
national budget for education and training over the last 10 years. Furthermore, the fund
for primary education contributed by the society in general and by individuals is
approximately equal to the national budget destined for the primary cycle. The
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Vietnamese Government planned to increase the budget for education and training from
15°% of the overall national budget in 2000 to 18% in 2005 and above 20% in 2010,
Vietnam has basically completed primary education universalization for children aged 6 14 by 2000. During the next decade, in conjunction with consolidation of anti-illiteracy,
the universalization of primary education will be enhanced to ensure that 99% of children
of the schooling age range (6 -11 years old) will be encouraged to attend schools. The
Vietnamese Government is fully committed to implement the universalization of
secondary education, raising the number of students in the age range of this cycle from
74% in 2000 to 80% in 2005 and 90% in 201071.
4.5.3 Health Development
Vietnam has achieved levels in basic health indicators that are remarkably better
than other developing countries with similar or even higher per capita incomes. Much of
this achievement has been the result of widespread practices of promoting social
solidarity and a relatively egalitarian distribution of wealth and income. Another factor
that has contributed to good levels of health status by such a poor country is a health
system that has wide population coverage with many modem and cost-effective disease
control interventions and primary health care services delivered through an extensive
grassroots health services network. Public investments and recurrent budget support for
the grassroots health network are being given priority attention. These efforts are
expected to yield gains in terms of further reductions in morbidity and mortality from
preventable causes through more effective disease prevention, health promotion, and
appropriate early treatment at the household, village, commune and district levels. Even
as large health gains are expected from anticipated improvements in community health,
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large numbers of sick patients still require higher level clinical care for which public
hospitals remains the almost exclusive provider72.
Vietnam has its own National Health Plan supported by WB as shown in the
project “ National Health Support”, approved on 16 Jan 1996 and closed on 31 March
2005, with the following details:
The National Health Support Project's overall objective was to improve the health
status of the rural population of Viet Nam in the poorer areas of the country. Specifically,
it aimed to (a) provide high quality, reliable primary health care on a sustainable basis in
sixteen of the poorer provinces; (b) reduce nationwide mortality and morbidity due to
malaria, tuberculosis and acute respiratory infections, as well as the adverse socioeconomic impacts associated with these diseases; and (c) strengthen the capacity of the
Ministry of Health (MOH) in policy-formulation, planning and management. To achieve
these objectives, the project consisted of the following components: service delivery in
the areas of infectious and communicable diseases; maternal and child health care; family
planning; reproductive health services; and other basic health care; national program
assistance for the Malaria, Tuberculosis and Acute Respiratory Infection Programs
including provision of drugs, insecticides, transport, equipment and technical assistance;
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and strengthening institutional health planning and management73. The key components
of the project and indicative costs were as follows74:
Component 1: Assistance to Commune and District Health Centers (US$60.1 million
equivalent to SDR 40.4 million estimated base cost, of which US$52 million or SDR 35
million was spent).
This component aimed to improve essential public health services at the primary
Commune Health Centers (CHCs) and first-referral level at District Health Centers
(DHCs) facilities in 15 provinces selected according to specific criteria outlined in the
Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). The subcomponents were: (1) A package of civil works to
upgrade or build new health facilities to meet certain minimum standards for service
delivery; (2) Provision of essential drugs, basic equipment and supplies to the CHCs and
DHCs; and (3) In-service training of health personnel to build capacity.
Outcome: (1) the project improved the quality of available primary health care services
within the specific provinces in the country; (2) the project through its well-targeted
focus on poor areas of the country improved the quality of health infrastructure available
in some of the poorest areas of the country thus creating a more equitable coverage of
quality primary health care.
Component 2: Assistance to Three National Priority Programs (US$51.4 million
equivalent estimated base cost, of which US$39.8 million was spent).
This component aimed to support three already established national health programs for
malaria, tuberculosis, and Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI) respectively. (1) The
National Malarial Control Program subcomponent aimed at protecting populations at risk
of malaria through locally effective anti-vector measures, improved program
management and epidemiological services. The project financed inputs such as
insecticides, equipment, transportation, training, and technical assistance. (2) The
National Tuberculosis Program aimed at reducing the TB incidence within the general
population as well as curing infected patients, through the attainment of a case finding
rate of 70% of new infectious patients and cure rate of 85% of all patients enrolled in
treatment. The project provided drugs, equipment, transportation, training and operations
support. (3) The ARI Program aimed to extend coverage of ARI treatments services to
100 percent of children under-five years of age by the year 1999 through the provision of
73
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inputs such as the training of workers, financing of drug treatment costs, and the large
scale implementation of a case management approach.
Outcome: The objective of component 2 to reduce mortality and morbidity due to
malaria, tuberculosis were not only met, but surpassed. Case fatality rate per 100,000 for
malaria declined from 0.24 (1997) to 0.09 (2002); the prevalence rate per 1000 has also
declined. The total annual number of deaths due to malaria declined from 203 in 1996 to
46 in 2003.

Figure 12 Annual Confirmed Malaria Deaths from 1990 to 2003

Source: National Health Support Project by the World Bank
In addition, the number of confirmed cases of malaria declined from 76,356 in 1996 to
37,416 in 2003.
Figure 13 Annual Confirmed Malaria Cases from 1990 to 2003

Source: National Health Support Project by the World Bank

Component 3: Strengthening Institutional Health Planning and Management in the
Ministry of Health (US$4.7 million equivalent estimated base cost, of which everything
was spent including an additional US$0.8 million, resulting in a total of about US$5.5
million).
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This component aimed to improve the beneficial impact of policies affecting the health
sector by enhancing the capacity of the MOH to use several health sector planning and
management tools. The subcomponents included: (1) Improving the planning and
management of public expenditures for health by (a) Improving the budgeting,
accounting, and operational reporting systems of the central MOH hospitals and
institutes, provincial health departments, and the central MOH; and (b) Preparing a public
investment plan for the health sector; (2) Assisting the government in better mobilizing
private financing for health by improving the system of setting, charging and collecting
prices for publicly provided health services to better protect the poor and increase
revenues available to enhance the quality and quantity of these services; and preparing
proposals for further expanding private production of health services; (3) Generating
population-based household data and analysis for health sector planning.
Outcome: The staff in the MOH have benefited from these activities and their level of
skills have been enhanced to use these policy tools, however, the project did not focus on
structural constraints to policy making and capacity building.
Generally, Vietnam has achieved the majority of human development goals as set and
illustrated in the sector of poverty reduction, education improvement and health
improvement as above.

Nowadays, the most ambitious attempt to analyze the

comparative status of socioeconomic development in both developing and developed
countries has been undertaken by UNDP in its annual series of Human Development
Reports. The centerpiece of these reports, which were initiated in 1990, is the
construction and refinement of the Human Development Index (HDI). This HDI attempts
to rank all countries on a scale of 0 (lowest human development) to 1 (highest human
development) based on the three goals or end products of development: longevity as
measured by life expectancy at birth, knowledge as measured by a weighted average of
adult literacy (two-thirds) and mean years of schooling(one-third), and standard of living
as measured by real per capita income adjusted for the differing purchasing power parity
of each country’s currency to reflect cost of living and for the assumption of diminishing
marginal utility of income. Using these three measures of development and applying a
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formula to data for 177 countries, the HDI ranks all countries into three groups: low
human development (0.0 to 0.499), medium human development (0.50 to 0.799), and
high human development (0.80 to 1.0)75. By these measures, The HDI for Viet Nam was
0.733, which gave the country a rank of 105th out of 177 countries with data in 2005 as
below:
Table 10 Vietnam’s human development index 2005
Adult
literacy
HDI value
rate
(% ages 15
and older)
1. Georgia
1. Iceland (0.968) 1. Japan (82.3)
(100.0)
55. Sri
103. El Salvador 54. Antigua and
Lanka
(0.735)
Barbuda (73.9)
(90.7)
Life
expectancy at
birth
(years)

105. Viet Nam
(0.733)
106. Occupied
Palestinian
Territories
(0.731)
107. Indonesia
(0.728)

Combined primary,
secondary and
tertiary gross
enrolment ratio
(%)

GDP per
capita
(PPP US$)

1. Australia (113.0)

1. Luxembourg
(60,228)

119. Syrian Arab
Republic (64.8)

120. Lesotho
(3,335)

56. Viet Nam
(73.7)

57. Viet
121. Viet Nam (63.9)
Nam (90.3)

122. Viet Nam
(3,071)

57. Malaysia
(73.7)

58.
Myanmar
(89.9)

122. India (63.8)

123. Bolivia
(2,819)

123. Vanuatu (63.4)

124. Cambodia
(2,727)

59.
58. Syrian Arab
Suriname
Republic (73.6)
(89.6)

Source: The Human Development Index – UNDP
The HDI measures the average progress of a country in human development. The
Human Poverty Index for developing countries (HPI-1) focuses on the proportion of
people below a threshold level in the same dimensions of human development as the
human development index - living a long and healthy life, having access to education,
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and a decent standard of living. By looking beyond income deprivation, the HPI-1
represents a multi-dimensional alternative to the $1 a day (PPP US$) poverty measure76.
The HPI-1 value of 15.2 for Viet Nam, ranks 36th among 108 developing
countries for which the index has been calculated. The HPI-1 measures severe
deprivation in health by the proportion of people who are not expected to survive age 40.
Education is measured by the adult illiteracy rate. And a decent standard of living is
measured by the unweighted average of people without access to an improved water
source and the proportion of children under age 5 who are underweight for their age.
Table 11 shows the values for these variables for Viet Nam and compares them to other
countries77.

Table 11: Selected indicators of human poverty for Vietnam
Adult
Probability of
Human
illiteracy rate
not surviving
Poverty Index
(%ages 15
past age 40 (%)
(HPI-1) 2004
and older)
2004
2004
1. Barbados
1. Iceland (1.4) 1. Estonia (0.2)
(3.0)
34. Jamaica
80. Sri Lanka
74. Belarus (6.7)
(14.3)
(9.3)
36. Viet Nam
(15.2)
37. Philippines
(15.3)
108. Chad

76. Viet Nam
(6.7)
77. China (6.8)
173. Zimbabwe

82. Viet Nam
(9.7)
83. Myanmar
(10.1)
164. Burkina

People without
access to an
improved water
source (%)2004

Children
underweight for
age (% ages 0-5)
2004

1. Thailand (1)

1. Czech Republic
(1)

53. Bolivia (15)

105. Djibouti (27)

107. Viet Nam
(27)
56. Philippines
108. Philippines
(15)
(28)
125. Ethiopia (78) 134. Bangladesh
55. Viet Nam (15)
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(56.9)

(57.4)

Faso (76.4)
(48)
Source: Human Development Index – UNDP

It can be concluded that Vietnam is one of the fastest growing economies in the
world. It is going through a far-reaching transformation from an inward-looking planned
economy to one that is globalized and market based. It has the potential to be one of the
great success stories in human development.
4.6. Analysis of the policy implementation of Vietnam
The adoption of a macroeconomic policy can be considered the dominant factor
for economic development of Vietnam. For an economy to develop, it requires policy
makers to select an economic theory/model applicable, practical, and feasible to
implement for the long run. In this regard, the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese
Communist Party (December 1986) marked a turning point of great significance to
transform the Vietnamese economy to an open, market-oriented, and globally integrated
model with a view to enacting policies for the integration of Vietnam into the world and
regional economies as discussed earlier. This model of development is well-suited to
Vietnam with its political and economic characteristics as a communist country.
The process of implementing the above policy has been handled thoroughly by
the communist leadership of Vietnam. Vietnam has been examining closely both internal
and external environments to make timely and appropriate decisions regardless of any
periods the country endured hardship or has been taking off. For example,

while

Vietnam was dealing with the China “factor” as indicated earlier in this the thesis,
particularly in differing Sino-Vietnamese positions in Kampuchea, and their mutual
border, it was seeking to capitalize on Soviet ties to fully protect itself from the Chinese
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hostility and international isolation. After a long period of time under Soviet protection,
i.e. being dependent on Soviet, Vietnam found its way out from this dependence by
joining the world. Since Vietnam started to engage the world, it has also been very
prudent to join regional and global cooperation on a step-by-step basis, i.e. one
organization after another, the participation of the former supports the participation of the
latter.

82

Chapter 5 - Challenges
While Vietnam has been scoring a number of significant economic and human
achievements as shown above, it has also been facing some challenges.
- The most noteworthy challenge would be a potential showdown in foreign direct
investment inflows as a result of the global financial crisis.
- Vietnam is in pursuit of privatization. As advised by the Party’s ideology,
however, the state-owned enterprises should remain dominant in the whole economy
system. It likely hinders a full market-based economy expected by foreign businesspeople
and investors. The ninth national congress of the Vietnam Communist Party, which met
in April 2001, endorsed a five-year program of SOE reform. This program has moved in
fits and starts; by the end of this period, 3,349 SOEs were restructured of which 2,188
were equitized. The state retains full ownership of 1,800 SOEs, including newly formed
large-scale conglomerates in posts and telecommunications, coal, oil and gas, electricity,
shipbuilding, cement, and textile and garments. The state sector is also privileged over
the private sector in terms of preferential bank credit, tax breaks, state contracts, access to
land, and government services. The state sector is also indebted. State commercial banks
continue to pour credit into industries that are most at risk from ASEAN competitors78.
- The wave of industrialization in the form of foreign direct investment projects
has been converted agricultural land into industrial parks. This reduces the livelihood of
farmers. This also leads to a new form of poverty suffered by landless farmers regardless
78
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of a considerable compensation paid by the government and foreign investors to them for
their land conversion. This could also reduce the Vietnamese volume of rice export to the
world market.
- Like any other countries on the development path, the environment of Vietnam
has been challenged by the process of development in the forms of trade liberalization
and foreign direct investment, especially in the area of exploring and exploiting metal
deposit. This challenge to combine environmental protection and sustainable economic
development is of vital importance to the Vietnamese government and the international
community.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion
From a dependent country facing famine and a failing centrally-planned economy
by mid 1980’s, Vietnam has emerged as one of the fastest growing economies in the
world. Real GDP has grown on average at the rate of 7.3 percent per year during 1995 –
2005.
Compared to U.S. dollars, income per capita rose from US$ 260 in 1995 to a 2007
level of US$ 835. By WB estimation, Vietnam would enter the ranks of middle income
countries by surpassing US$1,000 per capita next year (2010). Vietnam has been able to
reach most of the Millennium Development Goals. The following factors have lead to
Vietnam’s economic and human achievements:
1) Vietnam did a significant move in adopting an appropriate and timely decision
in foreign policy directions to graduate from dependence on the former U.S.S.R and to
engage in the world as seen from the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party
in December 1986. Relations with major powers and neighboring countries were put on
the Vietnamese’s top foreign policy agenda.
2) Vietnam implemented the process of integrating the global economy very
prudently at different levels for economic development. First, Vietnam unilaterally
implemented its economic reforms by encouraging foreign direct investment, expanding
more trading markets, and privatization. Second, Vietnam joined the sub-regional level of
South East Asia Nation via ASEAN in 1995. As an ASEAN member, Vietnam was
admitted to ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, AFTA, in December 1995. Under AFTA, the
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member countries are bound by CEPT mechanism to cut tariffs as mentioned earlier.
Third, Vietnam joined the supra-regional level of Asia-Pacific via APEC. The major goal
of APEC is to develop the Asia-Pacific region into an area of free trade and investment.
Fourth, Vietnam finally gained WTO membership in 1995. By partaking in these regional
and global economic institutions, Vietnam has been gainful from foreign direct
investment and trade liberalization; and
3) Vietnam has been working closely with IMF, WB, and UNDP for human
development within the framework of the MDGs. In the case of Vietnam, economic
development and human development are closely connected.
The model development of Vietnam as concluded above can be used as a success
story which would be adopted by other less developed countries, especially the remaining
communist countries like Cuba and North Korea. Vietnam’s development experience has
shown to the world that an appropriate foreign policy can make a break through into
international isolation.
Economic development can be achieved through foreign direct investment, trade
globalization, and privatization by international economic integration. Human
development can be achieved by reaching the MDGs and national plans in education and
health with strong supports of international multilateral development agencies like IMF,
WB, and UNDP and comprehensive national policy programs in socio-economic
development.
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Chapter 7 - Recommendations
This study finally has the following recommendations for further economic
development and human development of Vietnam.
- Vietnam should expand investment in the labor-intensive light industries
(textile, clothing, footwear) and some services (tourism) for these sectors to grow and to
be able to absorb the redundant labor force.
- Vietnam should have a long-term policy to invest in modern technology and
infrastructure to create a competitive environment for FDI because China and other
ASEAN countries are Vietnam’s main competitors for FDI.
- Vietnam should establish an integrated approach of foreign direct investment
incentives to harmonize the entire investment climate in Vietnam.
- Vietnam should build incentive mechanisms to attract self-financed Vietnamese
overseas students to return to Vietnam in order to contribute to economic development
and human development of the country.
- Vietnam should develop a long term plan for achieving economic and human
development in an environmentally sustainable way.
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